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I. INTRODUCTION
Computer software is very important.' The Supreme Court took
judicial notice that the value of computer programs used in the United
States was $43.1 billion in 1976 and projected to be $70.1 billion in
1980.2 Software will only grow in importance as every aspect of the
world's society and economy becomes dependent upon computer
technology in the Information Age. Yet U.S. law is criticized as pro-
viding uncertain protection of software's value.' Confusion has re-
sulted from Congressional and Court inaction. The world takes its
cues from U.S. law, as the United States is the world leader in
1. Harold C. Wegner, International Patent Law Developments, 4 FORDHAM IN-TELL.
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 329 (1993).
2. Parker v. Fook, 437 U.S. 584, 588, n.7 (1978). Software is so valuable that partial
ownership of Microsoft Corporation makes Microsoft's boss Bill Gates the richest man in the
country. Bill Gates is at the top of Forbes magazine's list of the richest 400 Americans with an
estimated net worth of $ 9.35 billion, almost all in Microsoft shares. Jack Schofield, Computing
94: Processor Wars and Rumors of Delays, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 29, 1994, at T14.
3. See generally Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs,
Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HAmv. L.
REv. 977, 983-84 (1993); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protec-
tion of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. R~v. 2307 (1994); J. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids
Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2432 (1994); Richard H.
Stem, Solving the Algorithm Conundrum: After 1994 in the Federal Circuit Patent Law Needs a
Radical Algorithmectomy, 22 AIPLA QJ. 167 (1994); Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind
of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN.
L. REv. 471, 507 and n.184 (1985) (citing other articles).
This paper is consistent with the Manifesto published by four authors traditionally identified
as opposed to broad copyright protection of software, wherein they advocate a sui generis ap-
proach to software protection. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COL. L. REv. 2308 (1994) (The key authors, Samuelson
and Reichman, propose a fuzzy outline of what a law like this should look like, while at the same
time other key authors in the field (Miller, Ginsberg, Goldstein) criticized the proposal as being
too generic, not specific enough, and confusing. The Manifesto called upon other writers to
resolve these criticisms by drafting a specific, concrete, unconfusing model act. This article does
exactly that.).
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software. Thus, it is increasingly important that a concrete proposal
be drafted to redefine software's role in the intellectual property statu-
tory scheme. A law to protect software is conceptually difficult, how-
ever, because software itself breaks the boundaries of traditional
copyright, patent, and trademark law. Software is an amalgam that
blurs the line between copyrightable art and patentable utility. It blurs
the line between intellectual property (valuable information) and phys-
ical property (nuts and bolts). Traditional physical objects have tran-
scended their physicality by becoming so charged with information
that they are now perceived in terms of what they do, rather than what
they are.4
This paper explores that blurred line by examining the confused
state of current law. The realities of the nature of software are ex-
amined. Preconceived traditional notions of intellectual property law
are discarded where they do not match software's nature. The result is
a proposed Software Act' that is as much a unique hybrid as the
software it seeks to protect. The new framework removes much of the
current overlap in laws by borrowing the best features offered by
copyright, patent, and trademark law. The theories underlying these
draft provisions are explained, and the relationship between this pro-
posal and international conventions is examined.
II. WHY WE NEED THis ACr
A. What is the Nature of Computer Software?
The preliminary problem confronting courts addressing the issue
of computer software protection is determining simply what computer
software is. Computer software defies categorization into the neat
legal compartments drawn to fit copyright, patent, and trademark law.
There is no existing body of law that can be incorporated by reference
to obtain an adequate, ready-made solution.' Software is a hybrid ex-
emplifying conflicting attributes within each of the traditional intellec-
tual property fields. Software's literary art, the words or computer
code, is protected by copyright law.7 Such art exhibits imagination,
originality, creativity, and individuality often far in excess of that
4. MJ. SALoNE, How TO CoPYRIHT SoFrwARE 8 (1984).
5. See infra Appendix.
6' Richard H. Stern, A Sui Generis Utility Model Law As An Alternative Legal Model for
Protecting Software, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PRop. L.. 108 (1993).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (a computer program
is a "literary work" within the meaning of § 101 of the Copyright Act.); see also H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
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found in the mundane works that receive time-honored copyright pro-
tection.8 Yet, there is no clear consensus as to what software is.
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act9 forbids protection of "any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, princi-
ple, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described."10
Software may be logically viewed as comprising any of these, because
software is such a useful form of art. Software's utility, where pro-
tected at all, is protected separately under patent law. In limited situa-
tions, patents have been granted upon aspects of computer software -
primarily comprising those forbidden by the Copyright Act. Yet, the
scope of patent law does not clearly encompass perhaps the most use-
ful aspect of software - its algorithms. Section 101 of the Patent Act"
protects only a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."12
Hence, much software falls within a no-man's land - sharing art and
utility aspects of both copyright law and patent law, yet encompassed
within neither.
B. Software Falls Into a Gap Between Copyright and Patent
Law
Copyright and patent law pull software apart to protect it. They
inconsistently treat software like a book for one purpose and like a
machine for another. Copyright law prevents others from copying the
words comprising software as though they were text and the images
on the screen as though they were pictures. Yet, literal copying is
rare. Far more often, a competitor uses new text to achieve a
workalike program.1 3 Courts are split on how to protect the way a
program interacts with a user, since the menu items, command
choices, and the visual or audible elements can be characterized as
copyrightable text, 4 pictures, sound, or a noncopyrightable functional
method of operation." Where patent law does attempt to protect
8. Miller, supra note 3, at 983-84.
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
12. Id.
13. See generally, Keith Stephens & John P. Summers, Software- Objects: A New Trend in
Programming, 12 SANTA CLARA CoMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1996).
14. Copyright in a computer program extends to the object code version of the program.
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) and Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)).
15. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995), affd per
curiam, I11 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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software's functionality, it may only do so by stretching the meaning
of protectable "process" or "machine" matter beyond traditional
recognition.
Where copyright and patent law protect software, they do both
too much and too little. Copyright and patent law do too much by
providing a grant of total exclusion. 6 Computers were deliberately
designed to share software, hardware, information, and data. A far
more appropriate proprietary grant for software would be the limited
right to compensation when software is used in a commercially shared
way. Copyright and patent law also do too much by protecting
software for a duration far in excess of its useful life.' 7 Simultane-
ously, copyright and patent law do too little to protect software, be-
cause their terminology does not reach far enough to encompass
aspects of software close to the borders of unprotectable matter under
either law. For example, neither copyright nor patent protects ideas
per se. Yet, the border between a patentable algorithm and a nonpat-
entable idea is a very thin line. Likewise, the border between these
arguably copyrightable expressions and a clearly noncopyrightable
function is blurred. Even when there are multiple ways like this to
express a noncopyrightable idea, does it make any sense for the law to
require the last comer to use the least efficient of such expressions
simply because a first comer copyrighted the most efficient? Effi-
ciency of prose is critically important for software. Computer copy-
right cases also make the distinction between literal prose and
nonliteral software expressions."a To avoid a multitude of categorical
schisms, software must now be recognized as its own unique category
of intellectual property with its own unified theory of protection, in-
cluding detailed statutory definitions to illuminate this otherwise ob-
scured field. The Software Act does so.
Courts have expressed the belief that applying copyright law to
computer programs is like attempting to fit the "proverbial square peg
into a round hole," since computer programs are simultaneously
highly functional utilitarian objects comprised of literary expres-
sions. 9 The Second Circuit, in Computer Associates International,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,2° found that the Copyright Act is not ideally suited
to deal with the dynamic technology of computer science, because it
16. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1988).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 302; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
18. See generally Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995);
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990); cf. Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
19. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992).
20. 982 F.2d 693.
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serves as a relatively weak barrier against infringement of a program's
theoretical interstices.21 The Ninth Circuit, in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc.,' adopted with "wholehearted agreement" the Second
Circuit's reasoning above, finding that due to the essentially utilitarian
hybrid nature of computer programs, no settled standard exists for dis-
tinguishing a protected expression from an unprotected idea in com-
puter software.2 3 It embraced the Altai approach to breaking down a
computer program into component subroutines and identifying the
idea or core functional element of each.24 The Third Circuit, in Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,' examined the copy-
right/patent gap and noted that copyright protects expression, while
patent protects functionality.26 Therefore, two different expressions
each performing the same function are equally copyrightable. Apple
Computer could copyright the specific instructions controlling its Ap-
ple computer, but Franklin Computer would have been free to create a
new, different set of instructions providing the same functionality to
control its Apple compatible computer, the Pineapple (however in this
case, Franklin did not write new code).27 In another case regarding
Apple Corporation, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International,
Inc.,28 a California district court called for specialized legislation rec-
ognizing the unique dual art/utility nature of computer software:
It may be that the copyright law is not the most appropriate shelter
under which to place this form of new technology and... a hybrid
or entirely new form of protection will have to be devised. That,
however, is up to Congress. This Court does not have the preroga-
tive of investing a new form of protection even if it wanted to. To
the extent it is free to express public policy, its choice is to place
computer programs into an existing category of legal protection as
against affording them no protection at all.2 9
The chief opponent to such a new statutory solution is Harvard
Law School Professor Arthur Miller. Professor Miller served as a
commissioner on the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), which Congress created in
1974 to recommend new technology amendments to Copyright Act.3"
21. Id. at 712.
22. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
23. Il at 1524.
24. Ud at 1525.
25. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
26. lId at 816.
27. Apple v. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253.
28. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
29. Apple v. Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 783.
30. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201(b)-(c), 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74.
19961
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Professor Miller argues against new software legislation because Con-
gress, via CONTU, has already foreseen, considered, and rejected a
large statutory overhaul for software.31 CONTU felt that the bounda-
ries of copyright law had recurringly been expanded to engulf new
technologies, such as, photographs, motion pictures, radio, television,
photocopying, and telecommunications. 32  Those boundaries were
thought to be flexible enough to expand yet again to accommodate
software.3 3 Therefore, CONTU's recommendations to Congress were
minimal, suggesting merely a new definition for the term "computer
program," as well as a provision permitting consumers to archive
software and adapt software to be compatible with their hardware.3a
Congress accepted CONTU's modest recommendations and en-
acted them verbatim as the 1980 Amendments to the Copyright Act.35
Congress's decision is vindicated in hindsight by the flourishing suc-
cess of the software industry since the 1980 amendments.
Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1980 in order to facili-
tate judicial clarification of the gaps in the statute with new theoretical
tests of infringement. Even today the 1980 amendments continue to
serve the purpose that Congress intended.36 Professor Miller argues
that courts have proven skillful at devising an analytical framework to
distinguish between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
function, and are also competent in sifting cases through this matrix.37
He credits federal judges with making extraordinary efforts to under-
stand new software technologies,38 concluding that the resulting case
law has simplified copyright principles into "an understandable and
sensible doctrinal matrix, obviating any need for a sui generis ap-
proach."39 Professor Miller aptly notes that today's statutory bright-
line test could become tomorrow's Maginot Line, due to the highly
fact-specific nature of software protection comparisons.4 0
Yet Professor Miller's argument is logically inconsistent and not
totally squared by the court decisions themselves. Logically, if
31. Miller, supra note 3, at 1023-24.
32. Id at 982.
33. Id at 981.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. 1993).
35. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028.
36. Miller, supra note 3, at 980-81, 1009 n.150.
37. Id at 992, 998.
38. Id at 1012 n.165. But cf Richard H. Stem, The Paperback Case, Part 2, IEEE MICRO,
Dec. 1990, at 39-40 (criticizing the idea-expression dichotomy used by the court in Lotus v.
Paperback as "unpredictable in scope... without any coherent rationalizing principle, and to-
tally destructive of business certainty").
39. Miller, supra note 3, at 1035-36.
40. Id at 1035.
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software cases are so inherently ad hoc based upon their fact-specific
nature, then how can any unified doctrinal matrix theory ever de-
velop? Moreover, much of the Software Act proposed in this paper is
primarily a codification of the doctrinal matrix that has already
evolved in the courts. This should not be objectionable to the wait-
and-see theory. Mere legislative approval of current case law should
assuage courts' fears of treading on unstable ground.
Finally, the wait-and-see theory is at odds with an increasing
number of court decisions wherein the courts themselves are crying
out for statutory guidance. In developing much of the case law to be
codified, Judge Keeton saw the court as a surveyor examining markers
and guideposts placed by Congress.41 The Second Circuit went even
further than the district court above. The Second Circuit found the
results of CONTU so ill-suited to computer software that it proposed a
second round of legislative changes.42
The proposed Software Act fulfills the concerns above by requir-
ing novelty and nonobviousness for protection. The Software Act also
creates bright-line statutory markers that go beyond the doctrinal ma-
trix devised by the courts. These markers should make a court's deter-
mination more swift and sure, while clearing public confusion over
what conduct constitutes infringement. Nor does the Software Act de-
prive courts of the discretion that Professor Miller urges is needed to
resolve highly fact-specific cases. The Software Act bolsters a court's
ability to fashion stronger decisions based upon a new statutory frame-
41. Bemoaning a lack of statutory "markers" defining software infringement, Judge Kee-
ton saw the court's responsibility this way:
No marker Congress has placed may be disregarded or relocated by courts. Even
in those instances where text and context make clear that literal description of a
marker is contrary to manifested meaning (as where "not" must be inserted or
deleted to make sense of the statutory language) what the court is doing is aptly
described as "locating," not "relocating," the marker Congress mandated. The
fewer the markers Congress has placed, the more critical it becomes that courts
assure that no marker escapes notice.
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 53 (D. Mass. 1990).
42. Generally, we think that copyright registration - with its indiscriminating avail-
ability - is not ideally suited to deal with the highly dynamic technology of com-
puter science. Thus far, many of the decisions in this area reflect the courts'
attempt to fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole .... In any event, now that
more than 12 years have passed since CONTU issued its final report, the resolu-
tion of this specific issue could benefit from further legislative investigation -
perhaps a CONTU H.
Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
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work. The presence of patent eligible subject matter must always be
determined upon the individual facts of each case.43
This approach is in keeping with the widely accepted determina-
tion of Second Circuit Judge Learned Hand that drawing the line be-
tween nonprotected idea and protected expression is a tricky business:
"Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever
can."'  Judge Hand went on to determine that, "Obviously, no princi-
ple can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the
'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' 'Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc."'45 The imprecise standard allowing a court to
search between the lines of a complaint for the scent of meritorious
claims is sometimes referred to as the "smell test."46 Under the
Software Act, a judge retains the flexibility to determine whether
something smells rotten, and thereafter fashion appropriate relief via
this statute.
Ironically, Professor Miller also faults courts for applying too
much ad hoc discretion when they create a new reverse engineering
fair use exception to infringement.47 First, he argues that such an ex-
ception is in apparent contradiction the Congressional intent displayed
in adopting CONTU's recommendations opposing reverse engineer-
ing.4" Additionally, he eschews new statutory boundaries, which
might constrain courts from such context-driven, highly fact-specific
based expansions. 49 Yet, Professor Miller is critical of courts that fail
to restrict themselves to Congress' implied statutory restrictions."
43. In re Trovato, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacated, opinion withdrawn, 60
F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (remanded for Board of Patent Appeals reconsideration in light of
Alappat and new PTO Examining Guidelines for Computer-Implemented Invention).
44. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
45. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (L.
Hand, J.).
46. Morgan Fiduciary, Ltd. v. Citizens & Southern Int'l Bank, 95 B.R. 232, 234
(S.D.Fla.1988) (paraphrasing Irwin Younger) ("Any trial judge will inevitably come to the con-
clusion on occasion that a certain case or claim or defense has a bad odor. Simply put, a matter
smells. Some smell so bad they stink.").
47. See infra part VI.D (discussing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
48. Miller, supra note 3, at 1013-32.
49. Id at 1013, 1028-30; Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880); see generally, Lotus
Dev. Corp.v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 43 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd per curiam, 111 S.Ct. 804
(1996); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993); Computer Assocs.
Int'l., Inc. v Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (2d Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 977 F.2d 832
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
50. Miller, supra note 3, at 1035.
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Professor Miller's views also discount the time and effort lost in
sidetracking eddies of case law,5 such as, the now often rejected
structure-sequence-organization analysis found in Whelan Associates
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 2 The Software Act revives the es-
sence of the doctrine, while avoiding its pitfalls, by making the appli-
cant specifically enumerate for the court which structure-sequence-
organization elements he seeks to protect.
C. Need for Harmonization with Other Countries
The United States must seek international solutions to its domes-
tic intellectual property problems, given the rapidly increasing impor-
tance of intellectual property on worldwide trade, national identity,
and economic well-being of nations.5 3 Harmonization would provide
U.S. attorneys with greater expertise in protecting their U.S. clients'
interests abroad, since the attorneys would need to learn only a single
legal system of protection. The Software Act is a step toward achiev-
ing such overall intellectual property law harmonization. The
Software Act advances the United States toward the patent system fol-
lowed by the rest of the world, the first-to-file system. 4
Scholars in the United States have cheered the recent TRIPs55
agreement as a giant step forward for protection of domestic intellec-
tual property abroad, since it forces other countries to protect com-
puter programs. 56 TRIPs requires member countries to treat computer
programs for copyright purposes as literary works, like books.57 Such
cheering is misplaced. Although copyright protection is better than no
protection, copyright is as much the wrong law abroad as it is domesti-
51. Id at 1013; see generally Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 43 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.
1995), aff'd per curiam, Il1 S. Ct. 804 (1996); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510 (9th Cir. 1993); Computer Assocs. Int'l., Inc. v Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992);
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (2d Cir. 1992); Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 977 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
52. 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
53. Ralph Oman, Berne Revision: The Continuing Drama, 4 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. ME-
DIA & ENrT. L.J. 139, 142 (1993) (suggesting that the United States proposed TRIPs is a "Berne
Plus" package requiring GATT members to recognize all of the economic rights guaranteed by
the Berne Convention).
54. Teresa Riordan, Patents; An Outspoken Inventor Protests Efforts to 'Harmonize'
Global Rules, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 29, 1993, at D2. Only the United States, Jordan and the Philip-
pines use the first-to-invent system. Id.
55. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Negotiations (the Uruguay
Round: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPs]; see also Oman, supra note 53.
56. See Oman, supra note 53; see also Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 121 (1994).
57. See Oman, supra note 53; Riordan, supra note 54.
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cally to protect software. The TRIPs agreement was achieved by the
U.S.'s strong-arm technique of dangling trade concession carrots in
exchange for software protection. 8 However, loopholes within TRIPs
allow foreign countries to delay for years the implementation of what
was achieved. 9 Even under the century-old Berne agreement, 0 fewer
than half of the Berne signatory nations actually provide adequate
copyright protection, even though their regulations technically comply
with the agreement.61 By marrying TRIPs compliance to Berne com-
pliance,62 the TRIPs achievements might be equally toothless.
The Software Act provides a better solution by providing lesser-
developed countries (LCDs) a real incentive for software protection,
since it gives them easier access to software licenses at a reasonable
fee. 63 Furthermore, foreign countries might actually be more comfort-
able enforcing the Software Act than they are enforcing laws crammed
down their throats, since these countries already have similar petite
patent acts for other nonsoftware fields.6r
58. Cordray, supra note 56, at 143 (stating that the Uruguay Round package deal gave the
United States the bargaining power to strong arm countries willing to make concessions in the
area of intellectual property for gains in other areas, such as, agriculture and textiles).
59. TRIPs, supra note 55, art. 66 (generally allowing countries 10 years to amend their
domestic laws to be consistent with the new TRIPs requirements, while it further allows LDCs
an indefinite extension).
60. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
61. Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in NAFTA, 8 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 817, 823 (1993) (citing Ulrich Joos & Rainer Moufang, Report on the Second
Ringberg Symposium, in GAIT OR WIPO? Naw WAYS IN aHE INTERNATIONAL PRoTEcrioN OF
INTrmLacruAL PROPmERTY 903 (Friedrich-KarI Beier & Gerhard Schricken eds., 1989).).
62. TRIPs, supra note 55, art. 9; cf. TRIPs, art. 2 (requiring compliance with the Berne
Convention).
63. See infra Appendix §§ 236-37.
64. The Software Act would be consistent with what already exists abroad. For example,
the German Utility Model Act of 1968, protects inventive concepts related to implements or
commodities. Feidrich-Kari Beir, et al., German Industrial Property, Copyright and Antitrust
Laws, VOL 6. STUn Es IN INDUsTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAw (Max Planck Institute
1983). A computer program is like an implement. Since it is essentially valueless in and of
itself, its only value is for what it does. The German Utility Model petty patent confers short-
term, simple, and inexpensive protection for smaller technical inventions. It is conferred upon
registration, without substantive examination, lasting for three years from application date, plus a
possible three-year extension. German petty patents grant the same rights as a regular patent.
However, they are enforceable only against third parties. Examination of the German petty pat-
ent takes place only upon an infringement or cancellation proceeding. The examination must
find a small, new, commercialy-applicable inventive step, not already the subject of a prior
patent - that has not been misappropriated from a third party. Id. The Software Act mirrors most
of these German petite patent act requirements.
MODEL SOFTWARE PETITE PATENT ACT
III. SOFITWARE AS COPYRIGHTABLE MATERIAL
A. Software as Art
1. Software's Dual-Natured Literal and Nonliteral
Expressiveness
Software's nature is intrinsically a hybrid combining both text
and action. Software's text is its literal expression, while software's
action is its nonliteral expression. Courts have found both forms of
expression to be copyrightable. Software text consists of a complex
set of instructions written in a formal computer language. The Third
Circuit, in Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer,6" held that both
source code and object code are protected as literary works. 6 The
Copyright Act's definition of "literary works" includes expression not
only in words but also "numbers, or other,. . . numerical symbols or
indicia."6 7 Ironically, the typical software customer never sees the lit-
eral expression that the author has diligently provided in the purchased
software. The process of compiling boils away human-readable ex-
pression by converting source code into its machine-readable object
code equivalent.68 Virtually all mass-distributed software is distrib-
uted in object code form.69 Hence, the expressive textual distinctive-
ness is filtered out before the customer ever comes in contact with the
software.
Computer programs also have inherent nonliteral aspects, which
make them different from ordinary works of literature. Computer pro-
grams take kinetic action when electricity is applied (not unlike acti-
vating the sounds and images captured in a sound recording or motion
pictures). Yet, computer programs go beyond mere replication of
prior performance. They interact with and adapt to the environment
around them and perform differently depending upon changing cir-
cumstances. Software literature's self-actuation feature distinguishes
it from conventional literary writing.
65. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
66. Il at 1249.
67. Object code binary language consists entirely of the numerals 0 and 1.
68. A compiler is defined as "a program designed to translate a high level language source
program into a corresponding machine code program. The compiler checks for, and reports, any
syntax errors in the source program. If the source program is syntax error free, then a complete
object code program is produced." Dennis Longley & Michael Shain, DIcriONARY oF ImNoatm,-
TION TECHNOLOGY 64 (2d ed. 1986).
69. Ronald L. Johnston & Allen R. Grogan, Trade Secret Protection for Mass Distributed
Software, 11 CoMPuTER LAw. 1 (1994). Johnston and Grogan successfully represented
Microsoft on the trade secret claims in Stac Elecs. v. Microsoft Corp., CV 93-413-ER, Feb. 23,
1994 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Id.
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Software's duality of expression is referred to as the "literary/
nonliterary" dichotomy. Not only is the text expressive in the way it
is written, but what the text does attains its own expressiveness. What
is particularly ironic about the recent judicial acceptance of this di-
chotomy is that the average user is interested only in the nonliteral
elements expressed by the software, i.e., the on-screen displays with
which he or she can interact. Nonliteral software expressions are
often as stylistically characteristic of their authors as is the text.
70
2. Judicial Acceptance of the Notion of Duality of
Expression
Courts have recognized the twin modes of literal and the nonlit-
eral software expression.7 Courts have granted separate copyright
protection to nonliteral elements, such as, a program's overall organi-
zation, the structure of its command system, and its presentation of
information on the screen.72  However, Congress has not explicitly
recognized nonliteral software elements as copyrightable. The 1980
amendment to the Copyright Act defines "computer program" as the
literal elements, 73 rather than nonliteral elements. There is no ques-
tion, however, that the music, pictorial, graphic, audiovisual,74 or
other expressions can be copyrighted to the extent they can be identi-
fied separately from the software.7  The legislative history of § 102
clearly shows that it is intended to be a suggestive rather than an ex-
haustive list.76 Courts have occasionally anticipated Congress adding
70. For example, programs written by Peter Norton (e.g., Norton's Utilities) are well
known for their powerful user friendliness in performing different systems maintenance tasks. A
single isolated program from this series might be recognizable on sight as a "Norton" merely
from its manner of display screens and method of operation.
71. See generally Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995);
Lotus Dee. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990);. Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
72. E.g., Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. 156, 166-67 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in
a computer in order to bring about a certain result.").
74. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
75. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (holding that the artist's ballerina shape of a
lamp base can be copyrighted because it is expressively separable from the noncopyrightable,
possibly patentable, useful object).
76. The use of the word "include." as defined in Section 101, makes clear that the
listing is "illustrative and not limitative," and that the seven categories do not
exhaust the scope of "original works of authorship" that the bill is intended to
protect. Rather, the list sets out the general area of copyrightable subject matter,
but with sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outdated concepts of
the scope of particular categories.
Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-1476 (reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 102 at 47, 49 (West 1996)).
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new technology and media to the list before Congress expressly does
SO.77 It seems likely that the courts are empowered to extend copy-
right to nonliteral software expression that can be separately identified
from the software itself.78
The current statutory dichotomy between useful articles79 and
copyrightable expression is not a helpful distinction for computer pro-
grams. While it may be that some arrangements or sequences of text
or graphics in the user interface may make the software easier to use
than others, the ultimate goal is usefulness. As Judge Keeton pointed
out:
It does not follow that when an intellectual work achieves the feat
of being useful as well as expressive and original, the moment of
creative triumph is also a moment of devastating financial loss -
because the triumph destroys copyrightability of all expressive ele-
ments which would have been protected if only they had not con-
tributed so much to the public interest by helping to make some
article useful.8°
The law should not require products to fall short of being the best
possible to achieve protection. This can hardly be the system that
Thomas Jefferson envisioned as our first patent Commissioner when
he authored the 1793 Patent Act.81
B. Why Copyright Law Does Not Protect Software Well
1. Derivative Works
In addition to utility limitations, copyright law is also difficult to
apply to software because of the difficulty in determining what a de-
rivative work of software is. Section 106(2), provides that only the
copyright owner may "prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work."8" Section 101 defines a "derivative work" as "a work
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as, a translation, mo-
tion picture version, sound recording, abridgment, condensation, or
77. E.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (finding that photo-
graphs were "writings" before Congress codified this in Copyright Act of 1909 § 50)).
78. Compare this to the contortions the courts have been forced to perform to squeeze
software algorithms within the Patent Act § 101 terms "process" and "machine," since Patent
Act § 101 is considered to be an exhaustive list of protectable subject matter. The courts cannot
simply invent a term like "nonliteral process" or "nonliteral machine" to encompass software
algorithms.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("an article having intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.").
80. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 57 (D. Mass. 1990).
81. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
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any other form in which a work may be adapted.""3 It is easy to deter-
mine that a motion picture The Bridges of Madison County is a deriva-
tive work of the book. Is a program a derivative work when it is
designed to work alongside another program? Is a program a deriva-
tive work if it adapts software for a new piece of hardware? In Whe-
lan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,'4 the district court
clarified that translating one computer language into another is not
comparable to translation from English to French, because it is not
generally possible to translate computer code into a line-by-line dupli-
cate in another language.85 This is due to the different methods and
manners in which each computer language operates.8 6 Many com-
puter languages are structurally dissimilar, so that accomplishing the
same algorithm in each requires wholly dissimilar instruction patterns.
However, many computer languages are similar, just as some human
languages are sentence-by-sentence similar to English.
The complication with software is that all software is comprised
of algorithms. Generally, the same algorithm can be written in a
number of different source code and object code implementations.
Unlike book-to-movie transformations, software derivative works gen-
erally result in the same medium - more original software code. In
some respects, every piece of software is derived from some other
software. Developers of later versions of software products benefit
greatly from the insights and mistakes of earlier programmers. Judge
Keeton, in Lotus Devevelopment Corp. v. Paperback Software Inter-
national,7 noted the virtually unchallenged premise of intellectual
property law is that progress of science and useful arts can only occur
where authors and inventors are privileged to build upon the earlier
progress of others: "If I have seen further it is by standing on ye shoul-
ders of Giants."88 Modem software adopts cooperative techniques,
such as, object-oriented programming and object-linking-and-embed-
ding.89 This gives today's software the capability of actually wrap-
ping itself around the other software's literal code.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
84. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, (E.D. Pa. 1985),
aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d. Cir 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
85. 609 F. Supp. at 1320.
86. Id. at 1320-21.
87. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
88. Itt at 77 (quoting Sir Isaac Newton, Letter to Robert Hooke, February 5, 1675/1676, as
quoted in ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHouuimEs OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN PosTscRIr 31
(1965)).
89. Gordon McLachlan, Cafe OLE; Microsoft's Object Linking and Embedding 2.0 Speci-
fication, HP PROFESSIONAL, Mar. 1995, at 52, available in LEXIS, NEWS Libary, CURNWS
File.
[Vol. 12
MODEL SOFTWARE PETITE PATENT ACT
The concept of derivative work infringement is also difficult to
apply to software because software is commonly released in updated
versions over time. Users continually demand more powerful features
as they become accustomed to the software and they envision new
uses for the software. Today there are multiple new types of hardware
that did not exist ten or fifteen years ago. Software must be updated to
know how to operate the new hardware. The only finished software
(nonderivative software) in existence is dead software (i.e., no one
uses it). Legislation is not needed to protect obsolete software at the
expense of new useful derivative software.
2. Copyright's Duration is Excessively Long for
Software
Current U.S. copyright protection generally lasts for a term of the
life of the author plus fifty years.9" This is an excessive period of time
to protect software. Even the twenty-year period of protection for al-
gorithms under the current Patent Act is inappropriately long for
software.9 1 In the fast-paced world of software, even the shorter pre-
GATT patent term of seventeen years" "might as well be a millen-
nium."93 Therefore, the Software Act protects software for only ten
years.94 Arguably, the petite protection could be shorter. However,
since many algorithms are reused, and since much or the older ver-
sions of software continue to be used long after they are no longer
sold, ten years seems like a reasonable period to earn royalties to com-
pensate for high development costs.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
92. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (amended 1994).
93. Brett Glass, Creative Licenses Do Patents on Programming Techniques Promote or
Hamper Tech Innovation?, SAN JosE MERcuRY NEws, Apr. 24, 1994, at IE (quoting Jerry Fid-
dler, Chairman of software vendor, Wind River Systems of Alameda, California).
94. See infra Appendix § 230. This term is analogous to the Semiconductor Chip Protec-
tion Act's 10-year duration of protection commencing on the date of registration or date of
commercial exploitation, whichever occurs first. 17 U.S.C. § 904. It also harmonizes with the
Draft European Community Directive 10-year protection against unauthorized data extraction.
MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN et al., 1 INmRNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNrrY AND EASTERN EUROPE 3-11 (1993). Under Article 9-1, a database itself gets the same
protection period as provided by the member country's copyright for literary works. Id. at 3-89.
However, under Article 9.3 an additional sui generis Unfair Extraction Right arises upon crea-
tion of the database, continuing 10 years from January Ist of the year following the date the
database is first lawfully made available to the public. Id at 3-90. Unfair Extraction is defined
by Article 2.5 as "unauthorized extraction or reutilization, from that database, of it contents, in
whole or in substantial part, for commercial purposes." Id at 3-85.
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IV. SOFTWARE AS A USEFUL OBJECT (PATENTABLE MATERIAL)
A. What is Patentable?
The Patent Act protects any "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter" or improvement thereof,95 that is novel96 and
non-obvious. 97 An invention must pass each of the above three tests,
or doors, to receive patent protection.98 Anything not included in the
§101 list of "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter" is simply not eligible for patent, since inclusion of these things in
the list necessarily excludes everything else.99 Because of the unique
nature of software, the availability of patent protection for software
has historically been uncertain.' 00
The preliminary question for software patent protection must be,
what is software? Is it a process, a machine, or is software merely an
unpatentable idea?' Article I, § 8, cl. 8 (the constitutional command
to "promote the Progress of... useful Arts") 102 is both a grant and
limitation of power. Congress may not grant patents that inhibit
(rather than promote) the progress of the useful arts. A patent on an
idea would inhibit the useful arts because it would "remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or restrict free access to materials
already available."103 Yet, society chooses for its own benefit to grant
unnatural patent rights on nonidea items, as an economic incentive to
develop and disclose these useful applications of ideas.
B. What Part of Software is Patentable?
1. Patentable Algorithms
In Gottschalk v. Benson,' °4 the Supreme Court held that a patent
claim for a method of programming a general purpose digital com-
puter is a claim for an algorithm. The Court defined an "algorithm" as
"[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem."'0 5
An algorithm is more comprehensively defined by computer scientists
95. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1996).
96. Id. § 102.
97. Id. § 103.
98. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
99. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
100. Stephen D. Kahn & Kenneth R. Parks, Computer Law Cases: The Year in Review;
Software Patents Are Now Easier to Obtain, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at S2.
101. An idea alone is not patentable. E.g., Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 498, 507 (1874).
102. U.S. CoNrs. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
103. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
104. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
105. Id. at 65.
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as: "a finite set of well defined rules for the solution of a problem in a
finite number of steps, for example, a precise description of the steps
involved in determining the record with the highest value of a speci-
fied numerical attribute." 10 6 Algorithms may be thought of as the part
of software containing its primary economic value, other than the
value attributed to the specific words comprising the program or its
user interface.
2. Algorithms Are the Same as Nonliteral Elements in
Copyright Law
With a regular patent, the description of the process is separable
from the process itself. A claimant's mere written instructions
describing a new way to tag dioxyribonucleic acid (DNA), for exam-
ple, do not actually produce any tagged DNA. On the other hand, a
written claim for an algorithm can be expressed either as a literal or
nonliteral expression of the algorithm. The literal description of the
algorithm is the algorithm itself. Hence, the mere literal description of
a software process is the process.10 7
For example, the line of Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp.108 (and Hewlett-Packard (HP)) infringement cases also could
have been analyzed as algorithm cases. The nonliteral elements at is-
sue were the shapes and tasks used to open, close, and move windows
and graphically representative icons. Apple's garbage-can deletion al-
gorithm might survive the filtration step. 1° 9 Hewlett-Packard's chal-
lenged wastebasket algorithm might be held substantially similar
under the comparison step. Thus, HP might be required to pay a li-
106. Longley & Shain, supra note 68, at 7.
107. For example, a literal algorithm to switch the contents of two variables could be
claimed in code written like this:
10 LEr C=A
20 LET A = B
30 LET B = C
The same algorithm could also be claimed nonliterally as series of narrative instructions, "take a
third variable and replace its contents with the value of the first variable, then replace the value
of the first variable with the value of the second variable, then replace the value of the second
variable with the third variable." Narrative expression of an algorithm can be a nonliteral ex-
pression of the literal code. George Ledin, Jr., A SrlcTuRo APPROACH TO GENERAL BASIC
57 (1978).
108. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20,
1989); 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 1989); 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1991)
(on reconsideration 779 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. Aug 14, 1991)); 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal.
Aug 7, 1992) (order clarified by 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (N.D. Cal., Apr 14, 1993)); 821 F. Supp.
616 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 1993), aff'd by 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. Sep. 19, 1994), cert. denied 115
S.Ct. 1176 (Feb. 21, 1995); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 1992 WL 75423,
1992 Corp.L.Dec. P 26, 903 (N.D. Cal. Apr 16, 1992).
109. See infra Appendix § 233.
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censing fee for the algorithm for a short time. Analyzed under the
Copyright Act, HP's indoor kitchen-style flip-top wastebasket was
held to have a dissimilar artistic appearance, and thus was not a copy
of Apple's outdoor alley-style cylindrical garbage can. 110 The
Software Act, however, might ignore the slight difference in appear-
ance and focus instead on the precise series of steps taken to perform
the same function. However, if HP were to demonstrate that its al-
gorithm required a step of clicking a mouse twice, rather than Apple's
once, this step could be dissimilar enough functionally that the same
conclusion of noninfringement might result under the Software Att.
C. Does a Software Algorithm Qualify as a Patent Act
Process?
1. Supreme Court Definition of "Process"
The Court has held that software algorithms can be included as
part of a Patent Act § 101 process, but by themselves they do not
constitute an eligible process. The term "process" is a term of art with
a meaning different from the standard dictionary meaning. The Patent
Act provides the circular definition that, "the term 'process' means
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.""' Thus,
the meaning of "process" must be divined from case law.
The Court, in Gottschalk v. Benson," 2 ruled that the term "pro-
cess" does not include purely mathematical digital computer software
algorithms.'' The term "process" traditionally requires physical
transformation of matter from one physical state into another physical
state.' " 4 A process does not include mathematical formulas, because
they merely transform one nonphysical form of numbers into a differ-
ent nonphysical form of numbers.' 15
In Dann v. Johnston,1 6 the government's brief suggests that Ben-
son may be overcome by showing software that synergizes with com-
puter hardware in a novel and nonobvious way in which "the whole in
some way exceeds the sum of the parts.""' 7 Where an algorithm is
realistically unsolvable without a computer, and where no computer
110. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. at 622.
111. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
112. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
113. Id at 71-72.
114. Id. at 71.
115. See e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (finding the conversion of binary-
coded decimal into pure binary to be a mathematical formula not a §101 'process').
116. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
117. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152.
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had been able to solve this type of problem without this algorithm,
then the two together become more than the sum of their parts."18 The
counterargument is that programs do not synergize when they simply
do what the hardware allows them to do, and where the hardware sim-
ply does the job it was instructed to do, without any surprising or
unexpected result." 9
The Court, in Parker v. Flook,'2 ° found algorithms to be patenta-
ble as part of a process, but "[tihe process itself, not merely the mathe-
matical algorithm, must be new and useful."'' Moreover, laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and mathematical formulas by themselves
are not the "kind of 'discoveries"' that the Patent Act was designed to
protect.' 2 2 Merely moving an algorithm to the middle of the process
by tacking on some post-solution activity does not make the algorithm
patentable.' 23 So, a new and useful process applying a well-known
algorithm may be patentable, while a new and useful algorithm apply-
ing a well-known process is not. However, it may be a close call
whether the process is new and useful or whether the algorithm is new
and useful. The Court feared that a patent on a mathematical formula
would wholly preempt use of that formula and effectively remove it
from the public domain, even if the applicant limited his claim to the
particular use he was making of it. 24
The Software Act overrides Flook's mathematical formula rule by
resolving its concern over preemption. No one will be able to wholly
preempt a field where compulsory licensing allows anyone to enter the
field by paying the first comer a reasonable price; the first comer is
compensated for his initial investment of research and develop-
ment. 2 The compulsory licensing fee provides the first comer the
needed incentive to perform the initial expensive research.
The Court, in Diamond v. Diehr,26 modified Benson and Flook
by holding that the claims should be considered as a whole to deter-
mine whether the algorithm performs a traditionally patentable manu-
118. 1&
119. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1243 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
120. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
121. Id. at 591 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 593 (emphasis added).
123. Id. The algorithm in Flook calculated alarm limits from time, temperature, pressure,
and flow rate variables, and then tacked on the activity of applying those calculated limits. Id. at
585.
124. 437 U.S. at 590.
125. See infra Appendix § 236.
126. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
19961
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facturing process. 27 In Diehr, the manufacturing process transformed
raw rubber granules into a baked solid mass, using an algorithm to
continuously measure temperature and calculate the remaining baking
time needed without overcooking or undercooking.
Many software algorithms fail as Diehr patentable processes be-
cause they do not make physical changes to raw materials. Instead
they merely changee a transistor from a negative state to a positive
charge (a "0" to a "1"). Many algorithms merely speed up data
processing in a computer or are only practical when used in a
computer.
2. Federal Circuit Court's Special Relationship to
Software Algorithms
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982128 expressly cre-
ated the Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") to
speak as a nationwide voice filling gaps left by Supreme Court inter-
pretations of patent (and specific other) issues. Congress realized that
the Supreme Court was operating at, or close to, full capacity. There-
fore, the Supreme Court's tie-breaking function was deliberately re-
duced on patent issues by making the intermediate appellate level
Federal Circuit a junior supreme court that eliminates inconsistent de-
cisions among the circuits. 129 Congress replaced intermediate appel-
late level courts of narrow jurisdiction with a single court providing
uniform answers to questions specifically enumerated by Congress.' 30
The Federal Circuit differs from its sister federal courts due to its ex-
clusive jurisdiction defined in subject matter rather than geographic
terms. 131
3. RAM/ROM Exemplifies "Process/Machine"
Definitional Conundrum
Lacking a detailed statute to guide the Federal Circuit in its deter-
mination of which algorithms are protectable subject matter under the
Patent Act has forced the court to take erratic positions in different
127. 1d at 183-84 ("'[tlhe process requires that certain things should be done with certain
substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may be of secondary
consequence."' (quoting Cochrane v. Deemer, 95 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1877))); cf. Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) ("[t]ransformation and reducing raw articles 'to a different state
or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines.").
128. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat. 25) I1.
129. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 13.
130. Id. at 12, 14.
131. Id. at 13.
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cases with similar facts. The Patent Act states processes and machines
may be claimed for patent. 132 In In re Iwahashi,133 Judge Rich, writ-
ing for two of a three-judge panel, found an algorithm for voice recog-
nition was a patentable "machine" or "manufacture" under § 101,
since it depended upon numbers permanently stored in ROM (read
only memory).1 34 Because ROM is physical hardware, thus "a spe-
cific piece of apparatus," it is a machine.1 35 However, five years later,
in In re Alappat,1 36 Judge Rich, writing the majority in an en banc
court, wavered from his earlier stance and found:
The Iwahashi court clearly did not find patentable subject matter
merely because a ROM was recited in the claim at issue; rather the
court held that the claim as a whole, directed to the combination of
the claimed means elements, including the claimed ROM as one
element, was directed to statutory subject matter. It was not the
ROM alone that carried the day.
137
What makes this turnabout unconvincing is that hardware and
software are logically equivalent. Any software operation can be built
directly as hardware, while any hardware instruction can be simulated
by software. This logical inconsistency of making a ROM algorithm
protectable and a RAM algorithm unprotectable, exacerbated by the
court's reversal, might lead one to question whether the Federal Cir-
cuit has indeed provided the certainty and consistency sought by the
Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982 in hearing all patent appeals
under one roof. Yet, it seems likely that the problem lies not with the
structure of the court, but rather with the structure of an outdated
statute.
The Software Act would assist courts in fashioning concrete dis-
tinctions of patentability by hanging them on a more detailed statutory
frame. It would eliminate the bothersome conundrum between non-
physical mathematical algorithms and physical/hardware algorithms.
Furthermore, one of its goals is to protect all software algorithms,
mathematical or not, with a weaker shorter-term protection, rather
than the full-strength, long-term protection of a regular patent. Fi-
nally, the Software Act addresses the Supreme Court's constitutional
concern regarding the Writing Clause's prohibition against removing
ideas from the public domain. Any software ideas that the Software
Act might protect would not already be in the public domain (hence
132. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
133. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
134. Id at 1375.
135. Id
136. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
137. Id at 1544 n.24.
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they could not be removed), and anyone is allowed full access to the
patented algorithms for commercial use upon payment of a reasonable
fee (while no fee is required for noncommercial use).
4. The Federal Circuit Court's Definition of "Process"
The Federal Circuit elaborated upon the Supreme Court's defini-
tion of "process" by finding in In re Schrader'38 that a claim is not a
protectable process if it mentions only mathematical algorithms and
fails to refer to physical acts of transforming materials into a different
state.139 The court in Schrader advises that the applicant must state
that physical effect in the claims where an algorithm does create a
physical transformation.1 40  Otherwise, any post-solution activity
could transform the otherwise unpatentable process into a patentable
process, thereby sanctioning form over substance.1 41
The so-called Freeman-Walter-Abele two-step test determines
compliance of both process and machine claims with § 101.142 The
first step is to determine whether a mathematical algorithm is recited
directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, then the second step is to
determine whether the invention as a whole is more than an algorithm
itself. In In re Warmerdam,143 the Federal Circuit found that a claim
as a whole is for nothing more than an algorithm itself where it fails to
claim any physical activity or limitations beyond the mere manipula-
tion of data."4 Thus, under the current law, mathematical algorithms
fail the Freeman-Walter-Abele test where the algorithms are not ap-
plied to, or limited by, physical elements or process steps.
These decisions seem to open the door for claims of a process
wherein a programmed machine has its physical memory chips trans-
formed by the algorithm or process from one configuration of particu-
lar data and mathematical constructs into another.1 45 Yet, one must
ask whether a computer memory chip altering its physical state from a
138. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
139. lad at 293-94.
140. Id.; see also In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902,908-09 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (concluding that while
merely displaying the result of a calculation is not a sufficient physical transformation, use of an
algorithm as part of a process of displaying data may be patentable as a part of that process).
141. Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)) ("The
concept of patentable subject matter under § 101 is not 'like a nose of wax which may be turned
and twisted in any direction . .
142. Id. at 292.
143. 33 F.3d 1354.
144. Id. at 1360 (sustained rejection of "bubble hierarchy" claims (i.e., collision avoidance
models enclosing objects inside imaginary mathematical spheres) because claims did not refer to
physical activity).
145. Id. at 1361.
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"1" to a "0," or a positive to a negative charge, is really the sort of
traditional physical transformation of raw material envisioned by the
Supreme Court." Is there really any physical transformation when
the tiny transistors in the chips can change back and forth from "1" to
"0" thousands of times per second? Conceptually, the software pro-
cess is a game of juggling algebraic variables that measure real-world
physical objects, but which themselves are not physical objects, no
matter how the claims are redrafted to try to meet the court definition
of process.
D. Does a Software Algorithm Qualify as a Patent Act §101
"Machine?"
Since the Supreme Court has effectively narrowed the meaning
of the term "process" in § 101 (despite its insistence that it has not
done so), the Federal Circuit has demonstrated a willingness to
broaden the meaning of the coequal term "machine."'147 The differ-
ence between the terms "process" and "machine" is at best illusory,
since any competent draftsman can readily convert from one form to
another.148 Draftsmanship can make an invention either a method or
an apparatus.' 49
In 1969, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals found in In re
Prater15 0 that there is no constitutional, statutory, or case law support
for the proposition that a "programmed general-purpose digital com-
puter [is] necessarily unpatentable."' 51 This novel approach likens a
general-purpose computer to a storeroom of electrical components.
The components are taken by a computer program out of the store-
room as needed, connected together, and a new machine built from
those parts. This theory was reiterated in In re Noll,'52 where a
programmed machine was found to be different from a machine with-
out the program. Physical electrical circuits configured the machine's
physical storage devices and electrical components to achieve con-
146. See supra notes 18, 112 and accompanying text, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 61, 71
(1972).
147. E.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
148. See Richard Stem, Tales from the Algorithm War: Benson to Iwahashi, It's Deja Vu All
Over Again, 18 AIPLA QJ. 371, 377-78 (1991). Process format and means-for format are iso-
morphic. The algorithm to making a peanut-butter sandwich can be expressed either as a "pro-
cess" or a "machine." Id. at 377. The difference between an "idea" and a "process" or
"machine" may be even more tenuous, given the generally intangible nature of software.
149. In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
150. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
151. I1& at 1403 n.29.
152. In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 148 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
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trolled results.' 53 Preemption was avoided because the patent applica-
tion excluded claims for hardware machines achieving the same
results without software. 15
4
In In re Alappat,15 the Federal Circuit adopted the theory set
forth by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.' 56 Therein, the
court held that a claim reading on a general purpose computer to carry
out its invention was in effect claiming a new machine created by the
instructions from the program software embodying the invention. 15 7
Since the computer implementing the claim was an apparatus, not
mathematics, it was a machine, not a process. The result in Alappat
sends a clear message to the Patent and Trademark Office that claims
drafted in apparatus form are very likely to meet the machine require-
ment, even if read to cover a general purpose computer consisting en-
tirely of old hardware elements. 15  However, pursuant to In re
Trovato,159 the claimant must be certain to disclose at least a specific
hardware embodiment in the specification, such as, Alappat's "arith-
metic logic circuits, barrel shifters, and a read only memory."' 60
Otherwise, where an application claims only software instructions
without tying them to a specification disclosing a structure physically
manipulating something in the real world, then the application will be
rejected as "drafted in an illusory apparatus format."'' In other
words, the Federal Circuit slapped Trovato on the wrist, giving her
(and the world) the precise corrective wording needed to redraft any
algorithm as a machine.
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of the term "machine" is tor-
tured at best. While it may be true that a computer program electroni-
cally connects the physical components differently from a computer
absent such program, it is not true that two computers containing the
same program will have components configured exactly same way.
153. Id
154. Id.
155. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
156. The Federal Circuit has adopted all of the holdings of its predecessor court, the
C.C.P.A. See South Corp. and Seal Fleet, Inc. v. U.S., 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc)
("We hold that the holdings of our predecessor courts, the U.S. Court of Claims and the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, announced by those courts before the close of business
September 30, 1982, shall be binding precedent in this court.").
157. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
158. Stephen D. Kahn & Kenneth R. Parks, Computer Law Cases: The Year in Review;
Software Patents Are Now Easier to Obtain, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at S2.
159. In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacated, opinion withdrawn, 60 F.3d 807
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (remanded for Board of Patent Appeals reconsideration in light of Alappat and
new PTO Examining Guidelines for Computer-Implemented Invention).
160. 42 F.3d at 1383 (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
161. Id (citing Application of Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 769 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
[Vol. 12
MODEL SOFTWARE PETITE PATENT ACT
By deliberate design, software may not create exactly the same
machine each time, because the program must cooperate with other
software and hardware also sharing the same storehouse of computer
components. Frequently, the programmer would have no ability to
make the software operate identically each time, even if the program-
mer had wanted to do so. A programmer will not know exactly where
the input files, output files, and temporary working files are physically
located on a disk, because it is the software's job to determine such
physical layout. The software may not use exactly the same RAM
components each time, may not display the same results on the moni-
tor each time, and may even utilize the CPU component quite differ-
ently to perform calculations. Even an identical program will create
very different machines when operating on an IBM-PC, Macintosh, or
parallel/vector computer, for the simple reason that each type of com-
puter contains a unique storeroom of components.
E. Why Patent Law Does Not Protect Software Well
1. Current Patent Protection is Both Too Narrow and
Too Broad
The present Patent Act is both too narrow and too broad to ade-
quately protect software and algorithms. Regular patents simply do
not fit the basic nature of algorithms and software. The apparent prob-
lem is that the current text of the Patent Act is too narrow to create
meaningful distinctions between what is patentable and what is not.
The Federal Circuit is making valiant attempts to shoehorn or stretch
algorithms to fit somewhere between the words "process" and
"machine." 16 While the court's job could be made much easier with
a statutory change actually adding the word "algorithm" to the §101
list, this alone would not solve all of the court's problems. Many
more definitions need to be added to create a statute upon which the
courts can rely.
Even if these changes were made, the Patent Act is still ill-suited
to protect software because its protection is far too broad. The seven-
teen-year length of patent protection (now twenty years under GATT)
far exceeds the useful life span of most software and many algo-
rithms. 163 Likewise, the Patent Act's breadth of protection is designed
to provide total exclusion of use throughout the United States."6 This
is unrealistic for software and algorithms due to independent reinven-
162. See supra parts IV.C-D.
163. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996); see Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-465 (H.R. 5110), signed Dec. 8, 1994.
164. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
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tion, the necessity for both hardware and software compatibility, and
intermodular software - where the user may not even know that the
software or algorithm is in use.
Furthermore, the time and cost of obtaining a patent are far too
high. A simple patent search can take more time than developing the
software. 165 Prior art searches are difficult for software because many
innovations are never published. 6 6 The Software Act proposes a solu-
tion to the searching problem by making a search unnecessary. An
applicant can file a standard application form, rather than a current
application of complex patent claims. Applications are not examined
in detail until a litigation conflict develops in the future. 167 Where
conflict develops, a court may invalidate software petite patents issued
to everyone after the first-to-file. Second comers need only pay a rea-
sonable compulsory licensing fee to the winner, or they may negotiate
a lower direct licensing amount.
2. Modem Software Breaks All the Rules
The Federal Circuit's standard that algorithms are processes or
machines hopelessly breaks down when applied to tomorrow's gener-
ation of software. A new generation of products has been announced
that allows the user to build compound applications by literally drag-
ging and dropping modules of one application into another.168 Object
Linking and Embedding (OLE) is a technology pioneered by
Microsoft Corporation that allows applications based on prebuilt com-
ponents.1 69 OLE increases the need for mandatory licensing because
it is so easy to put a little program inside another program.170
Compounding the OLE problem is LAN-to-LAN (local area net-
work) communications and remote access. 17 1 With this technology,
the question becomes where is the software? Is it being used at the
remote location, the local location, or both? Who is using the algo-
rithms? It seems likely that in the near future, software will be sold
165. Glass, supra note 93.
166. Jube Shiver, Jr., Low-tech Problems with High-tech Patents, L.A. TimEs, Jan. 9, 1994,
at DI ("A computer program either works orit doesn't work. You don't need the certification of
your peers to prove that.").
167. It is anticipated that the vast majority of software petite patents will not be litigated.
168. McLachlan, supra note 89.
169. Ide
170. Karen Rodriguez, Microsoft Network Gears Up With Tools For Technical Support,
IN-oWoRLD, Mar. 20, 1995, at 14.
171. Shiva Announces Major Enhancements to Remote Access Software for LanRover and
NetModem Platforms, Business Wire, Mar. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curnws File.
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and distributed electronically over the Internet, rather than in boxes
over the counter.172
This marriage of algorithm and hardware is further complicated
by OLE's ability to place motion-video files within other OLE-com-
pliant applications. The public becomes confused when one vendor
drops the proprietary video playback methods of another into a con-
sumer's innocent applications.
One solution to determining whose algorithm is being run in
OLE mix-and-match applications would be a simple metering scheme.
Each algorithm could trip a single mathematical flag each time it is
completed. This tally would be stored in a special database, file, chip,
or hardware. Royalties would then be contingent upon the metered
tally.
3. It Is Hard to Win a Software Patent Infringement Suit
a. The Software Act is Better Than Current Law's
Best Case Scenario
Software patent infringement suits are hard to win under the cur-
rent system, particularly when the accuser is much smaller than the
infringer. 7 3 Software CEO's say it is easy to get a software patent,
but hard to enforce it without a protracted, costly legal battle, and the
U.S. Supreme Court has never sided with a patent holder.' 74 A small
company with limited resources can be defeated long before the trial
date by a large company that strategically makes litigation expensive
and time-consuming through delaying discovery and motions. A
small company unable to continue litigation may be forced to settle on
unfavorable terms. This was exemplified by the David and Goliath
suit of Stac Electronics v. Microsoft Corp.75
Stac patented an LZS algorithm which effectively doubled the
capacity of a computer hard drive by using transparent on-the-fly
mathematics to compress data when stored and decompress data when
used.' 76  Stac's LZS algorithm consistently made the company's
"best-of-breed" and was the only product ever to win a second PC
Magazine Technical Excellence Award.177 This type of compression
172. Lee Wai Leong, Distributors of Software Products Should Take the Information High-
way, Bus. Trwms, Feb. 27, 1995, at 13.
173. John Dvorak, Will Prudes and Patents Stop the Multimedia Juggernaut?, PC CoMPurr-
INC, Feb. 1994, at 108 available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPH File.
174. Il
175. Stac Elecs. v. Microsoft Corp., CV 93-413-ER, Feb. 23, 1994 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
176. Stacker 4.0for OS/2 & DOS Breaks 2:1 Compression Barrier, Business Wire, Jan. 30,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
177. ld
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algorithm is important with today's computers because operating sys-
tems alone, like MS-DOS or IBM's OS/2, consume an ever increasing
percentage of a user's hard disk (typically 35Mb to 60Mb).
Meanwhile, Microsoft programs continued to be plagued with
bugs which frequently produced erroneous calculations."17 Microsoft
sought a license for Stac's algorithm, but no deal was reached despite
Microsoft's offer of $1 million per month.179 Furthermore, Microsoft
was criticized for writing inefficient, bloated software, for both IBM
compatible and Macintosh computers.180 As a result of the increased
need for compression of its disk-intensive Windows programs,
Microsoft incorporated Stac's algorithm into its MS-DOS 6. The en-
suing litigation that would either make or break Stac represented little
more than a minor irritation to the giant Microsoft. 81
Stac's lawyer, Morgan Chu, worried that a jury would think Stac
was seeking too much when asking for $110 million in damages. 182
Ironically, the Los Angeles jury awarded Stac $120 million for in-
fringement. 183 Stac's total award was reduced to $106.3 million. 184
The court entered a permanent injunction against Microsoft selling its
MS-DOS with Stac's algorithm.1 85
Stac could not afford the expense, uncertainty, or the three to four
year delay that would have resulted from an appeal to the U.S.
178. For example, several versions of Microsoft Windows contained a bug in the Calculator
applet. It frequently gave the erroneous result of.00 when the correct result should be .01. (Try
the simple subtraction of 2.01 - 2.00). Buzz Hunter, Want to Be Recognized as a Database
Confidential Investigative Reporter? Earn Your Credentials and a Shirt With a Good Tip, DATA
BASED ADvisoR, Feb. 1995, at 154.
179. Which is ironically what Microsoft ended up paying for the algorithm despite losing
one of the most contentious legal battles in software history.
180. James W. Crawley, It Was a Big Deal for Stac, Microsoft After a $120 Million Suit,
David and Goliath Forge Software Industry Alliance, SAN DIEoO UNION-TRJB., Jul. 26, 1994, at
C-I (quoting Rikki Kirzner, analyst for Dataquest, a Silicon Valley market research finn)
("Microsoft has always been known for pretty sloppy code; it eats the hell out of every-
thing .... It's not efficient, it's not well-written, it's not well designed."); Andy lhnatko, Plaque
Buildup, MAcUsER, Jan. 1995, at 23 ([T]he air has always been thick with rumors of Microsoft
not caring about the Mac market or even of its taking active steps to kill it off.").
181. Victoria Slind-Flor, The Lawyer Who Jammed Microsoft's Antitrust Deal, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 6, 1995, at BI (quoting Mark A. Flagel, head of Los Angeles' Irell & Manella's intellectual
property firm which represented Stac against Microsoft) ("It is difficult to take on Microsoft.
They are very arrogant and they leave no stone unturned.").
182. Steven Ludwig, et al., LABJ Cites Northrop Grumman Chief as Southland Exec of
1994, L.A. Bus. J., Jan. 30, 1995, § 1, at 1.
183. Morgan Chu, A Giant-Killer Should Limit Scope of Attack, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13, 1995,
Supp. at CIO.
184. Id. Stac was penalized $13.7 million for improper use of a Microsoft secret. Crawley,
supra note 180.
185. Crawley, supra note 180.
[Vol. 12
MODEL SOF7WARE PETITE PATENT ACT
Supreme Court.'8 6 Therefore, Stac settled Microsoft's appeal, receiv-
ing $83 million (or about 76 cents on the dollar). Microsoft also
bought a fifteen percent share of Stac.'1 7 The settlement also included
cross-licensing agreements that prohibit Microsoft from including
Stac's source or object code in its own products, but that do allow
Microsoft to write its own original data compression software utilizing
Stac's patented technology.' 88 This license requiring payment for new
code using old algorithms (and forbidding wholesale copying of code)
is exactly the scheme that the Software Act envisions via statutory
compulsory licensing.
Most firms would not do as well in similar litigation. Yet Stac's
final result was still a cross-license with royalty fees. Would it not
have been better to simply impose a statutory license, and leave it to
the court to determine the adequacy of the compensation? The
Software Act proposes such an approach.
b. Under the Current Law-Even When You Win,
You Lose
Litton Industries, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc."s9 demonstrated that
under the current law, even in the best case scenario, victory in an
infringement suit is illusory. Litton won what is believed to be the
largest patent infringement damages ever in the United States. 190 The
jury awarded damages of $1.2 billion. 9' Judge Mariana Pfaelzer of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California com-
pletely dismissed the verdict upon a finding that the patent was invalid
as a matter of law due to Litton's inequitable conduct in obtaining the
patent without informing the Patent Office of a published article re-
lated to its technology.' 92 While this particular patent had nothing to
do with software algorithms,' 93 the monumental jury award demon-
186. Stac incurred more than $8 million in legal fees from this conflict, while Microsoft's
seven counterclaims and declaratory judgment motion to invalidate Stac's patents for inequitable
conduct, increased both time and costs. Corporate Profiles 1995: Microsoft Can't Beat Stac, So
It Pays Stac, SAN Dmoo DAILY TRANSCIPT, Jan. 23, 1995, at S48 [hereinafter Corporate
Profiles].
187. Crawley, supra note 180.
188. Corporate Profiles, supra note 186.
189. CV 90-93, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 729 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 1995).
190. Susan Orenstein, Judge Throws Out $ 1.2 Billion Award, Invalidates Patent; Says Lit-
ton Withheld Information From PTO, REcoRDER, Jan. 10, 1995, at 1.
191. I.
192. Id. (quoting Judge Pfaelzer) ("Mhe jury's August 1993 award was 'inconsistent with
the clear weight of the evidence ... to permit it to stand would constitute a miscarriage of
justice."').
193. It was on coating mirrors used in aircraft navigation systems. Litton v. Honeywell,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2.
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strates the potential for factually and legally complex cases to result in
a windfall, equivalent to winning the lottery.' 94
The Software Act would solve these problems by providing a
vendor the certainty needed as an incentive to invent in the first place.
Compulsory licensing allows the big competitor to use the technology,
but it requires the competitor to pay a reasonable price for it. The
courtroom may continue to serve as a battlefield where the parties
wrangle about what amounts to a reasonable price, but the statute
would be favorable to the vendor. The Software Act will save the
parties, the government, and the public, unnecessary costs wasted on
court expenses and stifled product development.
4. Overreaching Patent Claims
Regular utility patents are inappropriate for algorithms and
software due to overreaching patent claims.195 A prime example is
Compton Encyclopedia's broadly worded patent that claimed tech-
niques used by multimedia software to search for data.196 These
claims seemed to cover virtually all multimedia and hypertext. 197
When Compton tried to enforce this patent, its multimedia competitors
raised such an uproar that PTO Commissioner Lehman took the ex-
traordinary step of sua sponte reexamining the patent.'19  The PTO
ultimately found significant prior art and vastly reduced the patent's
scope. 1
99
Overreaching claims will probably exist in every patent system.
However, the Software Act makes an effort to reduce the occurrence
and effect of overreaching claims because overreaching claims have a
more severe impact upon the software market than upon other mar-
kets. Because the software industry moves faster than other markets,
vendors are less likely to challenge overreaching claims of competi-
tors. They are more likely to simply avoid development and introduc-
tion of a product whose entire life cycle may be shorter than the patent
examination-litigation cycle. The Software Act seeks to prevent this
by limiting the prevalence of overarching claims through central
claiming rather than peripheral claiming. The Software Act increases
the speed of the patent cycle to match that of software development by
194. ' Orenstein, supra note 190 (quoting Matthew Powers, a partner in the Menlo Park of-
fice of New York's Weil, Gotshal & Manges, unrelated to the case).
195. Pamela S. Helyar & Gregory M. Doudnikoff, Walking the Labyrinth of Multimedia
Lav, 41 TEcH. COMM. 662, 665 (1994).
196. Id.
197. Hypertext uses text or graphics as entry points into a data set.
198. Helyar & Doudnikoff, supra note 195.
199. Id.
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eliminating the examination phase until challenged. Where an exam-
ining court finds overreaching claims, it may modify or strike them to
match what a claimant has actually implemented beyond a statutory
filter. The risk of infringement is diminished to reasonable compul-
sory fees. The fees should be greater than the cost of a directly negoti-
ated license (to encourage blanket clearing house licensing), but they
should be less than a cost that would impede development and stifle
innovation.
5. Patent Antitrust Issues
The Software Act is needed to alleviate antitrust problems now
occurring in the software industry. The software industry is exper-
iencing rapid consolidation toward a handful of vendors.
In today's market the small developer who does manage to invent
a software algorithm finds the algorithm too expensive to protect and
too expensive to litigate once protection is attained. The Supreme
Court has expressed its concern that small businessmen should be pro-
tected from elimination by large competitors, even where their de-
struction makes little difference to the overall economy. 0 For
example, Justice Douglas' concurrence in United States v. Falstaff
Brewing2"' described the crippling effect that the closing of the local
sawmill by large New York auditors had on Goldendale, Washing-
ton.202 Douglas forcefully noted that "a nation of clerks [rather than
entrepreneurs] is anathema to the American... dream. '20 3 Further-
more, he predicted that unhindered concentrations of power will lead
to big business owners who regulate markets like socialist production
commissars, in a way that is antagonistic to our system.20 4 The
Software Act would appease the Court's concern that antitrust laws
should promote avenues for small businesses to succeed. In the
software industry, there is not necessarily anything wrong with a big
company gobbling up all the good ideas of a little company (or even
gobbling up th€ little company itself), provided that the small vendor
is compensated with compulsory license fees (or better, negotiated li-
cense fees). The public users benefit from the latest and best features
conceived by the small businesses combined with the most popular
software produced by the largest vendors.
200. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
201. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
202. Id. at 543.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 543 (citing The Goal of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy - In Defence of Anti-
trust., 65 CoLT.M. L. REv. 377 (1965)).
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6. Supreme Court Calls for Legislation
The Supreme Court, in Benson,2" 5 stated that Congress has the
authority to authorize software algorithm patents.20 6 Congress may
draft such a statute since it is within Congress' purview to determine
what "promotes" the useful arts, as directed by the Constitution.
It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these
programs, a policy matter to which we are not competent to
speak .... [But if] these programs are to be patentable, considera-
ble problems are raised which only committees of Congress can
manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed including
hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those op-
erating in the field entertain. °7
The Court reiterated this suggestion in Flook208 stating: "Difficult
questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs that may be ap-
propriate for patent protection and the form and duration of such pro-
tection can be answered by Congress on the basis of current data not
equally available to this tribunal. ' 20 9 This paper concludes with the
suggestion that Congress should create a "small patent" or petite pat-
ent category for algorithms, which is of shorter duration and with
fewer requirements than current § 101 patents.
V. SOFTWARE AS COMMERCE (TRADEMARK MATERIAL)
A. Protect Only Software Used In Commerce
Computer programs are not merely forms of writing, they are
also products. The Software Act takes the position that only software
used in commerce should be protected. The purpose of statutory pro-
tection for software is to protect the economic value of software al-
ready written and to provide the economic incentive to write more.
Therefore, the scope of the protection should be limited to bolstering
that economic market. The market itself has demonstrated that physi-
cally preventing private, nonmarket copying of software does not pro-
tect the software, since consumers will simply refuse to purchase the
software. 10 The market has also demonstrated, through the success of
205. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
206. Id. at 72-73.
207. Id.
208. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
209. Id. at 595.
210. Bob Woods, Shareware Award Winners, NEWSBrrES, June 27, 1995, available in
Westlaw, Computer File (quoting Shareware Industry Awards Foundation director Eric
Robichaud) ("The shareware industry is growing very quickly because the 'try before you buy'
concept of shareware is becoming accepted by not only game publishers, but from business
leaders like Microsoft as well.").
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"shareware," that the market itself is only concerned about commer-
cial (including governmental) infringement.211 Furthermore, because
software is such a close variant of ideas and mathematics, any form of
software protection must address the concern about consuming the
whole field.
Under trademark law, only those products actually used in the
market are worthy of protection.212 Likewise, courts have become
concerned about competing software products that are so similar that
they may appear to be the same product to the user. Judge Keeton, in
Lotus v. Paperback,2 13 noted that "a user could easily think 1-2-3
rather than VP-Planner was the program in use."' 2 14 Software stand-
ardization brings the threat that two outwardly different programs that
operate the same way, like two different models of toasters, could con-
fuse users. There is no conceptual reason why a software vendor
should not get the eternal protection of a trademark on those features
(screen appearances, menus, or even "mode of operation") that indi-
cate to the public that the software with these features was produced
by a particular vendor. The Software Act suggests that those features
that become standardized as belonging to all similarly-situated toasters
should not be protected.
Software companies have discovered that copying makes for
good marketing. An indigenous "shareware" market has developed
outside the realm of the regular commercial market, which encourages
users to upload the software onto electronic bulletin boards and the
Internet, to demonstrate the software and its capabilities, and to give
copies to potential users.215 Shareware depends upon the honor sys-
tem for payment of nominal fees, often offering in exchange addi-
tional documentation, features, or updates. 2 6
In fact, there may be a benefit to allowing private, noncommer-
cial infringement, since the resulting increased exposure would ex-
pand the market for new software. Many programs have emerged
from shareware into viable, full-featured commercial versions by gain-
ing market acceptance.
211. Id
212. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
213. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
214. Id at 70.
215. See cases cited supra note 111.
216. For example, McAffee distributes industry standard anti-virus software on the elec-
tronic marketplace of Bulletin Board Systems ("BBSs") and via Internet. McAffee grants five
days of royalty free evaluation of the software. Then commercial and governmental users must
negotiate a license, while individual, noncommercial users receive a one-year nonexclusive right
to use one copy for $25 upon registration. McAffee, Inc., 2710 Walsh Avenue, Santa Clara,
California 95051-0963.
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B. Noncommercial Use Is Not Infringement
A distinction between commercial and noncommercial use of
copyrighted works is not new. Traditionally, noncommercial use of
literary works has not been wholly prohibited under copyright law.
Section 110 of the Copyright Act lists ten exemptions relating to the
noncommercial use of copyrighted works.217 The Audio Home Re-
cording Act of 1992218 likewise provides that "noncommercial use by
a consumer" is not an infringement.219 The Software Act is consistent
with these Congressionally approved noncommercial exemptions from
copyright protection.
C. Vaporware
The District Court for the District of Columbia recently ex-
pressed concern about the anticompetitive effect of Microsoft and
other vendors who publicly advertise new software without intent to
immediately supply that software to the market. 220 The court labeled
this as "vaporware. ' '221  Vaporware is defined as "the public an-
nouncement of a computer product before it is ready for market for the
sole purpose of causing consumers not to purchase a competitor's
product that has been developed and is either currently available for
sale or momentarily about to enter the market." 2 The Software Act
addresses the vaporware problem first by requiring an applicant to file
a good faith, bona fide "intent to use in commerce" form, similar to
that used in the Trademark Act, including the same perjury considera-
tions as in the Trademark Act.2  Second, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act224 would be amended to make preannouncing a product with
intent to injure a competitor an unfair or deceptive act or practice
(UDAP).
217. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1988) (including performance or display in a teaching environment,
nonprofit institution, or religious service; where there is no private gain and no owner objection;
transmissions received on a home-style apparatus; state fairs; music for blind or handicapped;
and veterans or fraternal organizations for charity).
218. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1001).
219. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
220. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 334 (D.D.C. 1995).
221. lId at 334.
222. lId
223. See Software Act § 224(b)(3), infra Appendix.
224. See Software Act § 233(c)(5), infra Appendix.
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D. Insufficient Lead Time to Recapture Software
Development Costs
Products that enter the marketplace first enjoy an inherent head
start advantage, which allows them to recapture costs of development
before competitors enter the market and force down the price.22
Combined with trade secret protection, monopoly protection on
software and algorithms may even be detrimental to society by unnec-
essarily retarding innovation by others. However, the software mar-
ketplace is unlike that of other markets. Although the cost of software
research and development is high,226 there is a short turnaround time
between initial production and competitor's release of derivative algo-
rithms and expressions.227 The short software lead time is long
enough to give competitors the advantage of seeing what does and
does not work, without risk. When the short lead time has expired,
free-riding competitors begin nipping at the heels with similar prod-
ucts. 228 The-cost of production and distribution is identically minimal
for both parties, since computer disks and data are fungible.229
Lead time is also reduced in the software market by the phenom-
enon of the "penguin effect," which does not appear in other markets.
Software users realize that new versions of any program will contain
bugs, compatibility problems, and even dangers to other properly
working software and data. Like penguins, potential lead time users
prefer to push their peers into the shark-infested waters to determine
whether it is a safe environment. In a Catch-22, software does not
become profitable until it becomes an industry standard, yet it cannot
become an industry standard until it develops sufficient market share
despite the penguin effect. This explains the aggressive advertising,
low initial pricing, and inexpensive upgrade path on new products.
The Software Act attempts to alleviate this conundrum by restoring an
artificial period of lead time to this industry - allowing the first comer
to receive temporary compulsory royalties to recoup the considerable
cost of research and development.2 0
225. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge To Intellectual Prop-
erty Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 897, 901 (1988).
226. Mark Aaron Paley, Lotus Lookalike Litigation: Landmark or Limbo?, 40 BuFF. L.
REv. 283, 310 (1992) (suggesting that today's software is years behind what today's hardware is
capable of supporting).
227. Il
228. Il
229. IL
230. See Software Act § 230, infra Appendix.
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E. Orphanware
Computer commentator John Dvorak coined the term
"orphanware" to refer to software that has been commercially aban-
doned.23" ' Dvorak suggests that companies with orphaned software
products should release the source code into the public domain.232
Many good products have been abandoned for marketing reasons, be-
cause sales were sluggish or support costs too high.3 Bad will is
created among angry consumers who are impliedly promised, via
heavy advertising, that they should risk a monetary and training in-
vestment in the product because the company will continue to main-
tain and improve the product 34
Dvorak's concept of abandonment is consistent with the view
under trademark law that protection should cease when commercial
use ceases.235 It would also harmonize the United States with the
many countries that maintain the principle that patent protection
should cease when the patent is not commercially exploited. The dif-
ficulty in applying a similar concept to software is software's similar-
ity to books, which do not lose protection due to nonuse. In fact,
copyrighted material remains protected even fifty years after an author
has died (whether or not a commercial market exists for the work).236
However, it is not conceptually inconsistent to carve out software
from other copyrighted material, and provide it with less protection.
Fifty years is an inappropriately excessive length of time to protect
software. Furthermore, copyright law carves out printed material con-
sisting solely of trademarks as nonregisterable.237
F. Patent "Bracketing" and "Mapping"
The Software Act's use in commerce requirement deliberately
prevents the techniques known as patent bracketing and patent map-
ping experienced with regular patents. "Patent bracketing" occurs
where a domestic company quickly reserves patents for itself on a
wide range of applications or improvements on a foreign patent.238
When the foreign competitor tries to enter the domestic market with
infringing products, the domestic patent owner simply offers a cross-
231. John C. Dvorak, Free the Code (DOS Source Code), PC COMPutnNo, Jan. 1995, at 75.
232. lId
233. Id.
234. Id
235. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1064 (West 1988).
236. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
237. Regulations for Registration of Claims to Copyright, 37 C.F.R. 202.10(c) (1995).
238. Kevin Rivette & Irving Rappaport, Golden Opportunities, LErAL TIMEs, Dec. 19,
1994, at 11.
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licensing agreement, thus avoiding a steep royalty fee in the other di-
rection.2 39 The similar technique known as "patent mapping," often
used by U.S. firms, involves an active search or scouring of existing
patents to look for unclaimed related fields or unclaimed improve-
ments.240 They look for the inventive high ground and then file pat-
ents reserving the broadest possible available tangential fields and
improvements. 41 The Software Act defeats these two techniques by
eliminating the reservation system. Only commercially used embodi-
ments of algorithms receive protection. Patent bracketing is elimi-
nated under a world-wide registration scheme that erases national
technological boundaries. Patent mapping is made unnecessary where
core algorithms are readily available for a reasonable fee under com-
pulsory licensing.
VI. NEW FEATURES UNDER THE Software Act
A. The Distinction Between Printware and Machineware
In 1908 the Supreme Court in White-Smith Music Publishing Co.
v. Apollo Co.24 distinguished perforated piano rolls from ordinary lit-
erary works because they were not intended to be read by humans.24 3
Even people skilled in making piano rolls were unable to read them as
literary or musical works. 2 " The perforated rolls became a part of a
machine since they were adapted to operate the machine to produce
copyrightable musical tones when properly applied.245 The Court ex-
pressly recognized Congress' prerogative to protect such machine-
readable works by statute, a6 whether via the Copyright Act or other
legislation, such as, the Software Act. Congress chose to protect
machine-readable works by amending the Copyright Act of 1976 defi-
nition of "copy" to include material objects "from which the work can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device."247
The Software Act codifies this same distinction between human-
readable software ("printware") and machine-readable software
("machineware"), providing different levels of protection for each.
The distinction removes printware from the Software Act, treating it
239. l4
240. l
241. Id.
242. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
243. Id
244. Id at 18.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
1996]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
like any other copyrightable literary work, and abiding by the TRIPs
mandate of protecting computer software as literary works under the
Berne Convention. 248 However, in compliance with White-Smith v.
Apollo,249 the Software Act provides a new statute offering lesser leg-
islative protection to machineware than it does to human-readable
software. The Software Act would provide Courts with a mechanism
to legitimately consider machineware a part of the machine. This dis-
tinction may seem somewhat incongruous since it is fairly easy to con-
vert from printware to machineware and vice versa. However, this
distinction is not as unusual as it may appear at first glance. Virtually
the same distinction with the similar rights is afforded in the music
industry. Although the sheet music for a song, as printed matter, is
fully protected by copyright,250 the right to reproduce the composition
in sound recordings is covered under the Copyright Act § 115 compul-
sory licensing scheme.". That section allows anyone, upon payment
of a statutory royalty, to record a "cover" version of the song (pro-
vided that the copyright owner of the song has explicitly authorized an
initial release of the song in sound recordings). In the same way,
when a software creator distributes the software in the form of a
printed book, the Copyright Act should apply to prevent others from
distributing copied books. However, when the material in the book is
converted into machineware, the Software Act would apply, granting
others a compulsory license to use the protectable elements in the
software.
B. Compulsory Licensing of Algorithms
Scholars argue that software patent licenses do not work very
well." 2 John Swinson points out three common arguments: (1)
searching for and understanding a patent is difficult even for the dili-
gent inventor; (2) large programs have thousands of algorithms to
search; and (3) large firms stifle competition by reserving broad mar-
kets of algorithms, then refuse to license (or demand high license fees)
or force competitors to waste resources inventing less efficient nonin-
fringing workarounds.353 The Software Act proposes to alleviate all of
these problems. The searching role is greatly reduced by removing it
as a prerequisite to a petite patent. Thus, a small inventor may file an
248. TRIPs, arts. 2, 9, 10; see also Oman, supra note 53.
249.. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
250. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
251. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
252. John Swinson, Copyright or Patent or Both: An Algorithmic Approach to Computer
Software Protection, 5 HIAv. J. L. & TECH. 145 (1991).
. 253. Id at 168-69.
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application without first searching for prior art. The search is only
necessary during the enforcement phase, to determine who filed first
and whether the claim was already in the public domain (i.e., an ex-
pired patent). The burden is placed primarily on those who can afford
it most - the big software vendors and the software rights societies.
Electronic access to the Software Registry should make their search
for a new feature even easier, while also providing corresponding pat-
ent numbers. Software rights societies can handle much of the search-
ing as they perform the administrative work of maintaining databases
of thousands of algorithms, just as ASCAP and BM1F54 do now in
maintaining databases of compositions, songwriters and music pub-
lishers. Under the Software Act, large firms will simply be unable to
reserve large swaths of unused algorithms. Absolute refusal to license
(or refusal to license at reasonable rates) is countered by compulsory
licensing for commercial users and free licensing for noncommercial
users.
C. Blanket Licensing
The Supreme Court, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.,- 5 condoned large organizations acting as
clearinghouses for licensing copyrighted works. The American Soci-
ety of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI) offered music users the right for a stated term to
publicly perform, as often as desired, compositions owned by its
members and affiliates." 6 The Court cited economic factors justify-
ing blanket licensing in the music market." 7 These economic factors
are not only paralleled, but actually exacerbated, in the software in-
dustry. The factors included: the extraordinary number of users across
the country; the sheer volume of copyrighted works; the enormous
quantity of performances each year; the ephemeral nature of each per-
formance; the ease of infringing (performing music in public) without
detection; the impracticality of negotiating individual licenses for each
composition; and the fact a music composition can be consumed
simultaneously by many different people without the owner's
knowledge."~
254. ASCAP (American Society of Composers Authors and Producers) and BMI (Business
Music, Inc.) are performance rights societies, which collect royalties for the public performance
of compositions on behalf of songwriters and publishers.
255. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979).
256. Id at 19-21.
257. Id at 20.
258. Id.
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The Software Act makes economic sense under the factors that
the Supreme Court applied to the music industry. The Court found
that blanket licensing results in a substantial lowering of costs, com-
pared to individual licensing, benefitting both sellers and buyers. 59 A
few large clearinghouses can achieve economies of scale in negotiat-
ing, monitoring, and administering licenses and payments. The clear-
inghouses can serve a market need by allowing immediate and flexible
access to many compositions without the delay of noneconomic nego-
tiations. There is a dire need for similar benefits in the software in-
dustry to protect small software creators. At the beginning of the
software industry, there was actually more good software coming out
of programmers' basements than in corporate computer labs. 260 How-
ever, the burgeoning cottage software industry has diminished par-
tially due to the increased complexity of today's software and partially
by the lone inventor's inability to protect his rights against large
firms. 26 ' The Software Act would protect a lone genius who files a
simple petite patent application, while allowing the big firm to con-
tinue incorporating new algorithms into existing applications (after
paying a reasonable fee to the basement inventor).
The Software Act is also consistent with the principle that authors
and artists need to be protected from hard-nosed businesspeople. The
law should free them to devote their talents to creating expressive
works rather than business wrangling. It is expected that unknown
and struggling artists do not have the business leverage or savvy nec-
essary to negotiate the best license possible. Likewise, the Software
Act considers computer programmers to be artists rather than business-
people. Computer programmers are basement inventors.262 An AS-
CAP-like agency, perhaps the Software Protection Association (SPA),
the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), the International
Society of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Computer Society
(IEEE), or similar organizations, would be appropriate clearinghouses
providing a standardized set of fees, thus relieving the small program-
mer of the need to perform such negotiation.
259. la at 21.
260. Wayne Ratliff wrote dBase HI, a program which is still selling well (despite the intro.
duction of dBase IV and dBase for Windows), virtually by himself in three months. Bill Gates
himself wrote MS-BASIC in a hotel room in a few weeks. The NEWDOS operating system for
the TRS-80, written by one programmer literally in his basement, was very successful because it
was so much more powerful than the official operating system TRS-DOS.
261. See supra part IV.E.3.
262. The old joke is that a real computer programmer's worst fear is direct sunlight.
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D. Reverse Engineering/Decompilation Right
Generally, the term "reverse engineering" of a computer program
refers to a variety of different activities used to reveal the design of
computer software. The least intrusive form of reverse engineering is
often referred to as "black-box" reverse engineering, which analyzes
the input and output of a program without attempting to view its inter-
nal design. Black-box engineering is often used to try to make one
program compatible or interoperable with another. More intrusive re-
verse engineering requires disassembling or decompiling software by
using special software to translate unintelligible machine-dependent
object code back into an approximation of the original human-reada-
ble machine-independent source code. The decompiled code will not
be exactly the same as the original source code. However, study of
the decompiled code can reveal the underlying design or engineering
of a computer program.263
Disassembly, by its very nature, requires making at least one
copy of a computer program, since the disassembly program generates
computer files and printouts of both the original object code and the
reconstructed source code. The disassembled source code itself also
constitutes a derivative work of the original object code program. As
users further modify, adapt, and recompile the disassembled source
code, they are making additional derivative works. Unless a fair use
exception is found,26 these acts violate a software owner's exclusive
rights.
265
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,266 held that since disas-
sembly involves copying and making derivative works, these acts are
squarely prohibited by § 106 of the Copyright Act.267 Thus reverse
engineering is per se unlawful.2 68 However, reverse engineering may
be a fair use where no alternative means exists to gain an understand-
ing of the underlying uncopyrightable ideas and functional concepts of
a work.2 69 Functional aspects of software are unprotected and
noncopyrightable under the Copyright Act.2 70 Thus, Accolade could
disassemble Sega's video game cartridges to discover these unpro-
tected functional components, since no other viable alternative existed
to discover them and could reverse engineer as much as needed to
263. Johnston & Grogan, supra note 69, at 4.
264. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
265. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
266. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993)
267. Id
268. Id at 1519-20.
269. Id. at 1527-28.
270. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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discover how to make cartridges functionally compatible with Sega's
Genesis machine.271 However, wholesale disassembly would still be
per se unlawful where fair use is not found.
In the wake of both the Ninth Circuit's Sega v. Accolade and the
Second Circuit's Computer Associates v. Altai, where reverse engi-
neering (i.e., "copying") was permitted to discover the uncopyright-
able functional elements, many software vendors are now dumping the
interface specifications in their competitor's laps. Software develop-
ers are allowing competitors to create functionally compatible prod-
ucts, as a way to foreclose the fair use argument by creating
alternative means to learn the unprotectable elements other than re-
verse engineering.
The Software Act suggests a far more equitable approach. Ven-
dors need not give away their functional compatibility standards for
free, by publishing them or by tolerating unfettered reverse engineer-
ing. Neither should competitors be locked out from industry stan-
dards. The Software Act achieves an even playing field by allowing
anyone to reverse engineer. Competitors may freely use any nonpro-
tectable elements, which would be filtered out under the infringement
test. However, competitors must pay a reasonable compulsory licens-
ing fee to use, in commercial software, the patented algorithms they
discover through reverse engineering.
The Software Act also discourages software trade secret infringe-
ment suits. Software vendors have begun to argue that valuable ideas
are hidden in the internal engineering of their mass distributed com-
mercial software.2 72 Microsoft won one such trade secret counter-
claim against Stac when Stac reverse engineered MS-DOS specifically
to uncover MS-DOS's unique ability to start up simultaneously with a
computer's power supply (discussed infra).273 Yet, legal and industry
commentators argue that the concept of trade secrets is inherently in-
consistent with a widely distributed product like software 4.2 7  The
trade secret law in many states holds that readily ascertainable infor-
mation is ineligible for trade secret protection because such informa-
tion is treated as generally known.27 The mere ability to disassemble
software (even where it is not practiced) renders software's secrets
inherently readily ascertainable and generally known. 276
271. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1993).
272. Johnston & Grogan, supra note 69, at 1.
273. Idl at 2.
274. Id at 5.
275. Id
276. Id
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Vendors attempt to counter these state trade secret laws by utiliz-
ing state contract law. Vendors insert shrinkwrap licenses wherein the
user agrees, by contract, to keep the trade secret in confidence and not
to reverse engineer.277 The Software Act clears any doubt about
whether federal copyright law or state trade secret law can prohibit
reverse engineering. The Software Act overrides them both. Further-
more, the Software Act encourages voluntary revelation of software
trade secrets either by publication or by patent, because functional
nonliteral elements not claimed in petite patents are fair game for unli-
censed usage.
E. Compulsory License Right to Port an Algorithm into New
Hardware
Generally, the term "porting" is used to mean the process of
adapting a piece of software to work in different hardware environ-
ments or new computers.27 Such adaptation can be analogized to the
recording of a musical composition. In music, we allow a second
comer to record a first comer's song in his own voice, as long as the
second comer pays a compulsory license fee to the creator of the
song.279 Software porting should operate the same way, allowing the
software to sing in a new machine with a different voice.
Critics may argue that a porting right is similar to a translation
right. Under the Copyright Act, only the author would have the right
to translate a work from English to French.28 0 But Congress realized
that a software consumer is interested primarily in computer uses of
software, not admiring software's copyrightable prose, aesthetic, and
artistic qualities.2"' Congress granted the software buyer or licensee
the right to adapt that software enough to make it work on the owner's
computer.28 2 The Software Act right to port is merely § 117(1) applied
to a third party who does not own the underlying software, but who
277. Id
278. IBM Dictionary of Computing 517 (George McDaniel ed.) (1994) (defining "port" as
"To make the programming changes necessary to allow a program that runs on one type of
computer to run on another type of computer").
279. E.g., Whitney Houston might be granted a compulsory license to reproduce her version
of Dolly Parton's "I Will Always Love You." In actuality, Houston probably licensed the song
privately from Parton without using the compulsory license scheme. Often such licenses are
granted at less than the statutory rate when a new recording is likely to be a hit. However, if
Parton did not wish to license the song, Houston could nonetheless record and release her version
by complying with the compulsory license provisions. See generally AL KOHN & Boa KOHN,
Ti ART OF Music L caEsINO, ch. 5 (1994)
280. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
281. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 117 (1976), reprinted at 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 117 (West 1996).
282. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1).
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pays a license fee. Hence, due to the special nature of computer
software, a porting right should overrule a vendor's § 106(2) exclusive
right to prevent others from translating his software. The royalty fee
for porting should be quite high, providing second comers with a low
profit, since porting is likely to make high use of the first comers'
algorithms and protected elements, while adding only minor protected
elements of the second comers' own.
F. Exhaustion
Most commercial software vendors do not sell their products to
their customers - they license the products. The typical shrinkwrap
license retains title to the software in the vendor in perpetuity. The
license prohibits consumers from reselling the software. What makes
shrinkwrap licenses a "really ugly field of the law" is that they involve
unsigned contracts governed by a mass of state contract law, which
has not kept pace with the growth of the software industry.28 3 "The
issue of software licensing is a national problem that requires federal
legislation to clarify licensing issues that involve software sold in in-
terstate commerce. '' 2 4 The Software Act provides exactly that legisla-
tion by determining that the petite patent right to sell off-the-shelf,
canned software ceases upon "first sale. A consumer should have as
much right to sell software when finished using it as he does to sell a
book when finished reading it. The Software Act makes economic
sense by allowing consumers to sell both old hardware and software in
a combined package to a new user. Many new users, frugal consum-
ers, and developing countries find value in old software. Ultimately
these novices will learn from the old software and eventually upgrade
to newer software themselves. As their needs expand to fill their com-
puter knowledge, they will eventually need to replace their hardware
with better equipment as well. Meanwhile, those who sell their old
software can then use the income to buy new, upgraded software, in-
creasing the overall commerce and demand in the market.
The Exhaustion Provision also alleviates problems of delegation
of software ownership rights like those in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.2 15 In that suit, MAI sold computer hardware and li-
censed computer software to many customers.28 6 It was undisputed
283. John Pallato, Sofiware and the Law, PC WEEK, Oct. 7, 1986, at 79 (quoting Norv
Brasch of Denver law firm Holme, Roberts & Owen) available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
ASAPII File.
284. IL
285. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1992).
286. Id at 513, 517 n.3.
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that MAI owned the copyright to the operating system software.2 87
Several MAI employees broke away from the firm and joined Peak
Computer, which performed routine maintenance and emergency re-
pair of MAI computers.288 Maintaining a computer and diagnosing
problems at the customer's site required running the MAI operating
system and viewing the MAI systems error log.289 The mere act of
turning on the computer caused MAI's software to be copied from a
storage medium into the computer's RAM (random access mem-
ory).290 The software license agreement allowed MAI customers to
use the software for their own internal information processing, but it
did not allow for use or copying of the software by third parties. 291
The Ninth Circuit determined that Peak violated MAI's copyright by
copying the software from hard disk into RAM.292 Although a MAI
customer was entitled to perform the same acts for itself, under the
software license, the MAI customer had no right to delegate these
rights to third parties to perform on the customer's behalf (however, if
the customer could have performed this maintenance for itself, it
would not need to call in a service company like Peak Computer).293
The seemingly inequitable outcome of this case would be recti-
fied in most cases under the Software Act. The Software Act would
provide that off-the-shelf (noncustom) software is sold to customers,
not licensed. The vendor's right to use the software is exhausted upon
the first sale of that particular copy. The exhausted rights, which cede
to the customer, may explicitly be encharged to a customer's author-
ized agent. However, as a compromise, the Software Act would not
allow MAI-type licenses in situations where the software is custom-
written (not off-the-shelf) for a particular client. In the custom-written
software transaction, the customer has greater leverage to bargain for
inclusion or exclusion of a third-party maintenance right via bona fide
direct negotiations.
G. Cheap Easy Filing
The current utility patent model requires an examination by tech-
nical experts of the utility, novelty, and inventive level of the inven-
tion.294 Although this serves to filter out inventions failing to meet
287. Id. at 517.
288. IX. at 513.
289. IM. at 518.
290. I1. at 511, 518.
291. Md. at 517.
292. I14 at 519.
293. Id. at 517.
294. 35 U.S.C. § 131.
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these statutory requirements, it can be expensive and time-consuming.
The Software Act endeavors to achieve a standardized filing form
much more like a simple Copyright Form TX or Form VA, which
even a layman can complete and submit for $20.00.295 Under the
Software Act's requirement of disclosing the patented sequence of
computer program steps, it will be necessary for an applicant to file a
complete source code or object code listing. Since many programs are
comprised of tens of thousands of lines of text, it would be acceptable
to submit the program in digital form. Object code submission would
be allowed because it discloses a sufficient quantity of information for
a programmer to reverse engineer it into an functioning approximation
of the original source code and algorithms.
The Copyright Office already maintains a Computer Shareware
Registry, to track ownership, transfer of ownership, and security inter-
ests in computer shareware. 29 6 The Patent and Trademark Office al-
ready requires applicants to file computer listings for long sequences
of DNA.2 97 Therefore, it would not be unreasonable for the govern-
ment to maintain a registry of software and algorithms. Nor would it
be unreasonable for the government to receive this information in a
digital format.
VII. WHAT CONSTITUTES INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE SOFTWARE
Act
A. What is the Purpose of an Infringement Action?
An infringement action would serve many purposes under the
Software Act. The patent search, the patent examination, the patent
interference, the patent opposition, and the patent transfer would all be
postponed until an infringement action is brought. It is expected that
the vast majority of software patents will never reach litigation. When
a party brings an action, all of the above functions will be performed
at once. A court would determine which party filed a valid claim first-
in-time, invalidate other claims, recast claims where necessary, trans-
fer misappropriated claims to the correct party, and impose reasonable
license fees and penalties on infringers.
295. See 17 U.S.C. § 708 (1988 & Supp. 1993); 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(c)(2) (1994).
296. Recordation of Documents Pertaining to Computer Shareware and Donation of Public
Domain Computer Software, 37 C.F.R. § 201.26 (1995).
297. Biotechnology Invention Disclosures Application Disclosures Containing Nucleotide
andfor Amino Acid Sequences, 37 C.F.R. § 1.821(e); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.821(a) (a "long
sequence" consists of an unabridged sequence of four or more).
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B. Overview of the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test to
be Codified
The infringement test used in Lotus v. Paperbackz"' and its prog-
eny evolved with insight from Professor Nimmer into the Abstraction-
Filtration-Comparison Test.299 Following a lengthy discussion on the
constitutionality of a court's ability to draft its own nonstatutory
test,300 Judge Keeton divined the infringement test by examining: (1)
the language of the statute as a whole;3 1 (2) its object and policy; 30 2
and (3) the markers that Congress had placed to delineate the bound-
ary between copyrightability and noncopyrightability. 30 3  Keeton
found that copyrightability turns upon whether or not an element ex-
presses an idea in an original way.3 4 To make such a determination,
the court first should determine what the idea and expression are; then,
filter out expressions unworthy of protection; and finally, compare the
accused expressions to remaining expressions to determine whether
they were copied.30 5
The first step is to separate the idea being expressed from the
expression itself. The court must conceptualize or abstract the idea
"along the scale from the most generalized conception to the most
particularized. ' '30 6 The abstraction process necessarily places the ex-
pression somewhere on a flexible continuum from very specific to
very abstract.307 The abstraction process itself biases its own out-
come, because the more specific an expression is ultimately deter-
mined to be, the more likely it will be found protectable. Furthermore,
the abstraction decision is doomed to be ad hoc in nature, based upon
the facts of the case.
298. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
299. See Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Acre Eng'g Co., Inc., 864 F. Supp. 1568, 1577 (S.D. Fla.
1994) (quoting 3 Nimmer § 13.03[F at 13-102.17) (proposing the abstraction-filtration-compari-
son test as a way to "help a court separate ideas [and processes] from expression and eliminate
from the substantial similarity analysis those portions of the work that are not eligible for copy-
right protection.").
300. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 46. It is ironic that the court should question its ability to
draft where Congress has been silent, since CONTU Commissioner Arthur Miller points out that
Congress adopted the Commission's position that the courts should be free to develop a doctrinal
matrix to fill in the gaps of the statute. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
301. 740 F. Supp. at 46, 47-51 (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) in turn citing
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
302. IeL at 46-47, 51-52 (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) in turn citing Off-
shore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentine, 477 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (citations omitted)).
303. I. at 47, 52-53 (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986)).
304. I. at 59-60.
305. Lotus v. Paperback at 60-61.
306. Id. at 60 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 479 U.S. 36 (1986)).
307. Id. at 60-61.
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The second step is to filter out expressions that cannot be copy-
righted. Under the merger doctrine, where there are only a limited
number of ways to express an idea, the expression cannot be copy-
righted. 08 The expression is said to merge with the idea because
other authors are left with no other noninfringing way to express the
unprotected idea. This is in effect granting a copyright on the idea
itself, 09 which The Copyright Act expressly forbids.
310
The third step of the test for infringement is a comparison of the
remaining protectable elements against the allegedly infringing ele-
ments. The Second Circuit, in Computer Associates v. Altai,311 called
these remaining elements the protectable "golden nugget" of a
software program. 12 If the accused software has misappropriated a
substantial portion of the golden nugget, then infringement has oc-
curred. In the comparison step, the decision maker must weigh the
quantitative and qualitative substance of the questioned expression. A
quantitatively small fragment of an expression may be qualitatively
large.313
Codification of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test be-
comes even more important today in light of the First Circuit's delib-
erate creation of a split between the circuits by rejecting the test. The
First Circuit, in Lotus v. Borland,314 explicitly created a split between
itself and the Ninth and Tenth Circuits by expressly side-stepping the
doctrinal analysis developed by its sister courts. 15 It also created an
implicit split with the Fifth Circuit, which expressly adopted the ab-
straction-filtration-comparison test in Engineering Dynamics v. Struc-
tural Software.316 The First Circuit's drawing of lines in the sand is a
virtual invitation to Congress (or the Supreme Court) to settle the rift.
The Software Act does so.
The First Circuit unhelpfully created a doctrinal schism by stray-
ing from application of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to
every software infringement case. The First Circuit did so despite ad-
mitting it was navigating uncharted waters in a case of first impres-
.308. Id at 59.
309. Id. (citing Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967)).
310. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
311. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
312. Id. at 710.
313. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 61 (D. Mass. 1990).
314. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l., Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (Ist Cir. 1995), aff'd per curiam,
116 S.Ct. 804 (1996).
315. 49 F.3d at 814-15.
316. Eng'g Dynamics v. Structural Software, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995), supplementing 26
F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994).
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sion.31 7 The First Circuit set the wrong course. In Lotus v. Borland,
the First Circuit held that the abstraction-filtration-comparison test
does not apply to cases of literal copying. The court reasoned that the
abstraction step is unnecessary since literal elements are already ab-
stracted as themselves. The court suggested that confusion can be
avoided in literal copying cases by completely skipping the abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison test. However, in this author's opinion, cre-
ating a bifurcated infringement test actually creates more confusion
without saving the court any real work. Furthermore, whether or not
the court officially labels it as such, it must nevertheless perform an
abstraction step by framing the issue to be decided.
The First Circuit, in Lotus v. Borland, inherently performed an
abstraction step by determining the issue to be "[w]hether a computer
menu command hierarchy constitutes copyrightable subject mat-
ter.'' 3 " The abstracted element to be tested was the menu command
hierarchy. The court merely needed to proceed to the filtration step,
apply the Copyright Act § 102(b) method of operation filtration, and
eliminate the menu command hierarchy element as uncopyrightable.
The court would then proceed to the comparison step, find no ele-
ments remaining after the filtration step and come to the same conclu-
sion that it did where it skipped this abstraction-filtration-comparison
test. There was no need for the First Circuit to depart from the estab-
lished test. The First Circuit's mistake was shortsightedness in seeing
only a single filter available as a filter (i.e., the merger doctrine filter).
The Tenth Circuit in Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemical' 9 cor-
rectly found many filters capable of removing unprotectable elements
during the filtration step, including: any of the reasons in § 102(b);320
public domain elements; elements dictated by function under the
merger doctrine; and common or banal scenes a faire.321 By codifying
the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the Software Act would pre-
vent courts from roaming away from the standard test, even if they
ultimately arrive at the same conclusion.
317. Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d at 813.
318. l
319. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
320. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation,
concepts).
321. Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 836-38 (describing scenes a faire as stock elements of com-
puter programs dictated by the standards or compatibility requirements of hardware, software,
industry, or programming).
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C. The Abstraction Step
The Abstraction Step is effective in dissecting computer pro-
grams because the test breaks down the program in a way that paral-
lels typical program development.322 Expert witnesses are often
necessary to provide the court with guidance in applying the abstrac-
tion test. The Tenth Circuit suggests six levels of generally declining
abstraction: (1) the main purpose, (2) the program structure or archi-
tecture, (3) modules, (4) algorithms and data structures, (5) source
code, and (6) object code.323 The Second Circuit described the levels
of abstraction as ascending from object code, to source code, to pa-
rameter lists, to services required, to general outline.324
The Software Act would force the applicant to do the initial work
of conceptualization by openly announcing in the claims exactly what
is to be protected. Requiring the applicant to be this forthright not
only creates a bright line, delineating which claims are unavailable for
expropriation without royalty, but narrowing the claims also makes
them more likely to survive review. Narrow claims are more protect-
able than broad claims (which are likely to encompass prior art). The
Software Act does not deprive the court of its ability to determine the
level of abstraction at which to cast the elements. The Software Act
would assist the court in reaching its abstraction decision by making
the applicant draft the first pass. The court will use the drafted claims
as guidance, but it will be free to recast the claims as appropriate. As
Judge Keeton pointed out, a computer element should not be concep-
tualized along the scale of abstraction as a mathematical calculation;
rather, it is more akin to a metaphorical human calculation, where a
balancing of the "scales of justice" regularly involved in daily human
affairs is involved.325
D. The Filtration Step
A court having identified the elements claiming protection,
should then filter out those elements which are not deserving of pro-
tection. The Second Circuit, in Computer Associates v. Altai,326 rec-
ognized that expressions fall outside of copyright protection where
they are: already in the public domain; incidental to the idea; dictated
by functional demand or the nature of other programs; or scenes a
322. Id. at 834.
323. kla at 835.
324. Computer Assocs. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 714 (2d Cir. 1992).
325. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 60-61 (D. Mass. 1990).
326. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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faire.327 The Software Act would also provide a filter for nonprofit,
noncommercial use, more expansive and simple, which encompasses
essentially all of the Copyright Act's fair use exceptions, 328 as well as
the complicated and detailed lobbyist group exemptions. 3
29
Filtration principles were explained further by the Ninth Circuit
in Sega v. Accolade330 where Accolade reverse engineered software
controlling the popular Sega Genesis game cartridges and console.
Accolade disassembled three Sega cartridges, then experimented with
reconstructed source code ("copies") to discover how to make game
cartridges compatible with Sega's console.331 The Ninth Circuit held
these intermediary copies to be fair use as a matter of law,332 since
disassembly was the only method providing access to the unprotected
functional 333 requirements of console compatibility. The court al-
lowed Accolade to use a literal copy of a twenty-byte header initializa-
tion code necessary to make their games functionally compatible.334
The court could also have allowed such copying on the theory that is
was de minimis (a small or insignificant portion of the protected
work), since a complete game consisted of 500,000 to 1,500,000
bytes.335 On the other hand, the court was possibly better off avoiding
the de minimis theory, since it is vulnerable to the argument that the
portion copied is quantitatively small but qualitatively large in eco-
nomic value. The irony of Sega v. Accolade lies in the fact Sega re-
fused the compensation proposed by Accolade in a proffered
license.336 The result of Sega's attempt to enforce its copyright was a
total loss of all compensation for its code. Accolade had sought the
compatibility license before it even attempted to reverse engineer
Sega's code.33 7 Sega refused unless it retained exclusive right to man-
ufacture all game cartridges produced by Accolade.338 The litigation
resulted in Accolade receiving for free that which it had offered to
pay. This seems like an economically senseless solution for all par-
ties. The money that Accolade spent on reverse engineering could
have been better spent on compensating Sega with license fees in ex-
327. Id at 706-10.
328. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research).
329. 17 U.S.C. § I10.
330. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
331. Id at 1514-15.
332. Id at 1514.
333. 17 U.S.C. §102(b).
334. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F. 2d 1510, 1516, 1524 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992).
335. Id at 1516.
336. Id at 1514.
337. Id
338. Id
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change for more information from Sega than its own trial-and-error
research could provide. Likewise, Sega incurred the unnecessary and
distraction of litigation, without offsetting license fee income and a
permanent loss of future license fees.
The Software Act would resolve this situation differently, provid-
ing a better result for all parties. The Software Act would grant Acco-
lade a right to reverse engineer the Sega's product for compatibility
and pay Sega a reasonable compulsory license fee. Alternatively,
since most firms will be economically encouraged to deposit their al-
gorithms in a blanket licensing agency, Accolade could avoid the cost
of reverse engineering, receive accurate compatibility information
from the clearinghouse, and pay a reasonable fee to the clearinghouse.
This system provides first comers like Sega with an economic incen-
tive to develop the hardware game console in the first place, since
Sega would know that second comers would pay a fee for compatibil-
ity. The second comers would have an incentive to produce such
compatible products, since they will know in advance what the fee
will be to sell such products. The public will benefit by finding a
wider selection of compatible products from which to choose. Those
second comers who do not want to pay the fee remain free to attempt
to create their own standard with their own hardware.
E. Not Filters
Protecting software under the Software Act differs significantly
from protecting software under the Copyright Act. The Software Act
would accept as protectable any of the reasons listed in the Copyright
Act for rejecting copyright protection (i.e., idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery). 339
While this may appear at first blush to be a radical view, it is not. The
§ 102(b) exclusions primarily enumerate precisely what cannot be
protected by copyright. Yet, these exclusions are generally within the
domain of patent. Since the Software Act is a patent statute it makes
sense to embrace these as protectable. It is often these aspects of
software that have precisely the troublesome hurdles that courts faced
when trying to protect software via copyright. As discussed above,
the very nature of software is that it has utility or usefulness. The
purpose of the Software Act is to provide a way of protecting that very
functionality and usefulness without having to pretend that software is
something that it is not. Many of the algorithms that the Software Act
would protect are actually in fact named "functions" in computer ter-
339. Compare Software Act § 234(c). infra Appendix with 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West
Supp. 1996).
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minology, while others are named "procedures" (meaning a subrou-
tine, which may or may not accept arguments as input, and which do
not return an output value upon conclusion).
The Software Act also rejects the merger doctrine because it is an
unnecessary hinderance under this scheme.1'0 The merger doctrine
seeks to avoid expropriation of ideas by denying a monopoly upon
expressions of those ideas where only a few means of expression ex-
ist. The Software Act eliminates this conundrum by recognizing that
the nature of software is such that the difference between an idea and
an expression of an algorithm is very small.
Therefore, by implication, the Supreme Court's prohibition
against protection for pure mathematical algorithms, as in Benson,34'
is also unnecessary. The distinction between a pure mathematical al-
gorithm and some other kind of algorithm is an impossible one to
make. Neither the courts nor the public should have to suffer uncer-
tainty in trying to determine which kind of algorithm they have.
Under the Software Act, if Einstein were to create his famous E=mc2
the day after enactment of the Act, he could acquire a patent on the
pure mathematical formula encompassed in his commercial software.
Teller and Oppenheimer could pay him a fee for a few years to incor-
porate the formula in their own commercial bomb software. More
likely, an algorithm clearinghouse would contract with Einstein to act
as his licensing agent along with the unexpired Newton and Kessler
algorithms, so a commercial physicist could pay an annual fee to li-
cense all of the necessary algorithms to blow his comrades to smither-
eens. University researchers would not have to be concerned about
the fees, because their use would be noncommercial, nonprofit.
For those who still have their doubts about this scheme, there is
also the consideration that the Software Act protects only two things:
(1) literal software code in a machine-readable form, and (2) algo-
rithms which meet all of the requirements under the definition of the
term. The definition states that an algorithm must contain all the fol-
lowing elements: (1) a sequence of precisely defined computer pro-
gram steps, (2) that will work for data of a specified range and type,
(3) to produce answers of a specified quality, (4) that unambiguously
solve a particular one of a specified general class of problems, (5) in a
reasonably efficient finite time, and (6) using a reasonably efficient
finite allotment of computational resources. Even algorithms meeting
this narrow definition fail protection under the Software Act unless
340. Software Act § 234(e), infra Appendix.
341. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); see also supra notes 112-115 and accompa-
nying text.
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they also meet the test of patentability, requiring: (1) a new, (2) non-
obvious inventive step, (3) used in commerce, (4) in computer
software, and (5) in a new and useful configuration.
The above requirements do create a fairly bright-line test. A
software creator can identify those portions of his code that he be-
lieves meet these requirements. While the Software Act will not cir-
cumvent the regular Patent Act questions about what is novel or what
is obvious, this is well-trod ground. Under the Software Act, however,
these questions do not even arise until the patent is challenged, then an
examination occurs.
F. The Comparison Step and Remedies for Infringement
The Software Act requires the decision maker to look at the ele-
ments that have survived the filtration step. The court then determines
whether there has been literal or nonliteral copying of those remaining
elements. Literal copying of those elements that have survived filtra-
tion for de minimis use is particularly disfavored. Therefore, for literal
copying, the court should impose substantial penalties, costs, or actual
damages. Nonliteral copying of either literal elements or nonliteral
elements has a much more lenient remedy. Infringed parties are enti-
tled to be put in the same position as they would have been in if the
infringer had taken a license from the beginning of the infringement.
Infringers should also pay a reasonably small penalty. Otherwise, in-
fringers would have no incentive to voluntarily take a directly negoti-
ated or compulsory license, as they could pay the same amount after
being caught, taken to court, and losing.
The Software Act also allows a court to transfer a patent to the
rightful owner, rather than requiring such owner to file an independent
application as the patent act requires. Invalidating someone else's pat-
ent is not very helpful if one can not get the patent transferred into
one's own name. The transfer right will also harmonize our law with
European law. If a court finds prior use in commerce of the algorithm,
the court may order registration of the petite patent, relating back to
the date of first proved use, upon the filing of an application.
VIII. ENACTMENT OF THE SOFTWARE AcT
A. Where to Put the Software Act - Copyright Act vs. Patent Act?
1. Amending the Copyright Act
It is not a new development to append other types of law onto the
Copyright Act. Unfair competition law was tacked onto the Copyright
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Act, via the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992,342 which establishes
a compulsory royalty scheme on digital media used to make private
(noncommercial) digital copies. Likewise, petite-type patent law was
tacked onto the Copyright Act via the Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984.341 It would, therefore, be reasonable to append the
Software Act's petite patent law onto the Copyright Act, where
software currently receives its greatest protection anyway. The
Software Act, as a part of the Copyright Act, would be compatible
with the Berne Convention by providing national treatment, as well as
granting the same protection to both domestic and Member inventors.
The Berne Convention leaves it to each country to define "literary and
artistic works" for itself.3 " Since Berne provides that "literary and
artistic works" include (nonexclusively) "every production in the liter-
ary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form
of its expression,"345 then software algorithms must certainly be in-
cluded within this broad scope. Berne does not require a particular
level of originality, so the Software Act could potentially include algo-
rithms lacking originality within its definition of "literary and artistic
works." The Software Act, however, may seem at odds with GATT-
TRIPs Article 10.1, which requires that Berne member countries pro-
tect computer software as "literary works," thus granting Berne Arti-
cle 7(1) lifetime-plus-50-years protection. The Software Act skirts this
problem by allowing just the human-readable printed software to re-
ceive standard Berne life-plus-fifty term, while restricting machine-
readable magnetic software to its short term protection. This should
be acceptable, since Berne allows member countries to provide new
protections outside the Convention's scope,346 which grant less than
Bere's normal minimum rights.
Likewise, even limited protection of ideas is outside the scope of
the Beme Convention, which exudes a general abhorrence of monopo-
lies removing ideas from the public domain. The Software Act, how-
ever, does not remove formulas of nature and mathematical algorithms
entirely from the public domain because it only protects specified
commercial embodiments, leaving all other embodiments and non-
commercial use in the public domain. Even where the Software Act
does protect an idea, it allows access to everyone for a reasonable fee.
Furthermore, the Software Act's short-term duration only requires rea-
342. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 1001).
343. Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended at 17 U.S. C. §§ 901-914).
344. Berne Convention, arts. 2(2), 2(4).
345. Id art. 2(1).
346. Id art. 19.
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sonable fees for a period long enough to compensate the inventor for
the commercial release of the idea into the world.
2. Amending the Patent Act
It is more sensible to append the Software Act to the Patent Act,
rather than the Copyright Act. The Software Act would fit in well
among the other petite patents, such as, design patents 347 and plant
patents.348 More importantly, the Software Act begins a series of steps
necessary to reform the whole Patent Act into harmony with the rest
of the world. One might even argue that amending the Software Act to
the Patent Act is consistent with GATT-TRIPs Agreement art. 27 (1),
which requires WTO (World Trade Organization) countries to make
patent protection available to inventions in "all fields of technol-
ogy."' 3 4 9 If integrated into the Patent Act, then international obliga-
tions under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property of 1883350 would be triggered.
The Software Act is not only consistent with, but is better than,
the Paris Convention, which permits member countries to grant roy-
alty-free nonexclusive compulsory licenses if a patent is not
"worked. '35 1 The Software Act, consistent with TRIPs Article 31, re-
quires compensation to the patentee and judicial review of both the
license grant and the amount of compensation. 352 The Paris Conven-
tion obviates the need to file simultaneously in every country where
one desires patent protection, even though the territorial grant requires
a separate filing in each jurisdiction.353 The Paris Convention pro-
vides that these separate applications do not have to be filed simulta-
neously, generally allowing later filings to inherit the initial date the
application was first filed in a member country.354 However, the Paris
Convention does not go far enough in providing a single worldwide
site where a member may file a single application and receive protec-
tion in each country. This Software Act proposes a unified Algorithm
Office where filings may be made to grant protection in every country
which agrees to this concept.
347. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173.
348. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164.
349. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 IL.M. 81, 93 (emphasis
added).
350. Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TLADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 121, 123
(1994) (citing Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305., art 2(1) [hereinafter Paris Convention)).
351. Paris Convention, supra note 350, art. 5(2).
352. See Software Act § 228, infra Appendix.
353. Paris Convention, supra note 350, art. 4(A).
354. Id.
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However, new treaties with other countries would probably be
needed anyway, because the international conventions do not cover
this subject matter. The reluctance of GATT countries to agree to
copyright protection for something as venerable as sound recordings,
strongly suggests that they might shy away from agreeing to protect
something as nebulous (yet valuable) as algorithms. Even a bilateral
agreement with a single country, namely Japan,355 would relieve much
of the U.S.'s international trade concerns. The Paris Convention 356
and Berne Convention, art. 20351 permit special agreements among
member countries granting more extensive intellectual property rights,
as long as such special agreements do not contravene the
Conventions.358
B. Beyond the Patent Cooperation Treaty - The Internet
Convention
The Software Act should not be limited to the United States.
Software today often needs success in two or three world markets to
survive. An international convention similar to the Berne or Paris
Conventions, including technical as well as legal experts, should be
convened to implement worldwide algorithm petite patent uniform
rules and enforcement. Such a software convention would be
uniquely situated to draw expert commentary from every comer of the
planet by the people most affected by the outcome, via the Internet.
Hence, the convention might be called the "Internet Convention."
Separate Internet channels for official communication might be pro-
vided, along with Usenet discussion groups for those with interested
commentary. The draft act presented in this paper might serve as a
kernel for the debate. The United States might achieve international
harmony by working in advance with other countries, rather than
cramming a fait accompli solution down their throats. An interna-
tional electronic discussion might lead to the end of the Japanese pol-
icy of rejecting software patent applications for failing to apply
scientific laws or clearly defined applications. 359
The Software Act seeks consistency with the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT), yet provides additional protections not implemented in
355. See Harold C. Wegner, International Patent Law Developments, 4 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDLIA & ENwr. L.J. 329, 330 (1993).
356. Cordray, supra note 350, at 142.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Japanese Patent Office Rejects AT&T's Linear Programming Algorithm Patent Claim,
COMLINE DAILY NEws CoMPurrsi, Jun. 5, 1991.
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the PCT.360 The PCT simplifies filing by allowing a single, standard-
ized, international application form to be filed in a local patent of-
fice.36' The applicant lists the countries where a patent is sought,
includes translations and registration fees for each country, and the
WIPO forwards the application to each country, after an international
search is performed. 362 The PCT does not harmonize substantive pat-
ent laws, it merely simplifies multinational filing procedures.363 The
Software Act envisions true one-stop filing for uniglobal, multinational
protection. A single filing in any member country's patent office
would provide the protection in all other member countries. This type
of protection was considered but not implemented in the Patent Coop-
eration Treaty. Multinational markets are needed in today's shrinking
world to succeed commercially in the software business. However,
PCT membership is limited to countries that are already members of
the Paris Convention, 3 4 which explains why as of January 1, 1988,
there were only 40 parties to the PCT.361 The Software Act should not
be limited to Paris Convention countries. It would be in the best inter-
est of both developed and lesser developed countries for the LCD's to
join the Software Convention out of their own self interest. Devel-
oped countries receive legal access to markets where software piracy
is the current standard; LCD's get compulsory licenses that legally
allow them to use foreign software algorithms, as well as automatic
protection for their own works. The Software Act eliminates the
lengthy and expensive search process, since the first to file automati-
cally receives priority if there are reasons for invalidating it as prior
art.
If the world is to move toward eventual true harmony of utility
patents, it is sensible to start down this path with petite patents. Let
petite patents break the ground and serve as a beta test to work out the
problems of implementing such an infrastructure. By definition, the
mistakes, or growing pains, of a petite patent would be less than they
would be for a grand patent. After the path has been hewn, utility
patents may follow. It is particularly sensible to begin unifiling with
software patents, since the world (in the Internet Age) is rapidly be-
360. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970 (ratified in U.S. 1975) 28 U.S.T. 7645,
T.I.A.S. 8733, 9 I.L.M. 978 (1970) [hereinafter Patent Cooperation Treaty].
361. Id, art. 11.
362. Id, art. 3.
363. Joseph Greenwald & Charles Levy, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Patent
Cooperation Treaty, I B.D.I.E.L. 831 (C.C.H. 1994).
364. Id.; see also Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 360, art. 62 (on becoming a party to
the treaty).
365. Greenwald & Levy, supra note 363, at 831-32. There were 97 parties to the Paris
Convention as of January 1, 1988. Id. at 677-78.
[Vol. 12
MODEL SOFTWARE PETITE PATENT ACT
coming interconnected anyway. Software patents are particularly well
suited to submission by electronic means. Generally, software already
exists as text in a computer. Although software may contain algo-
rithms or nonliteral elements which are not text, software does not
generally require the "drawing" that most machine-type inventions do.
The average programmer would be able to fill out a standardized form
found directly in the text of the software, much like the way lay peo-
ple currently fill out Copyright Form TX. The petite patent applica-
tion form would then be submitted electronically (along with
electronic payment) from any computer in the world connected to a
telephone. While it may be somewhat ethnocentric to require filing in
the English language,366 English is often considered the international
language of business, and even more so, the language of computing.
IX. CONCLUSION - OPENING THE DOOR TO THE SOFWARE ACT
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals described the Patent
Act's subject matter requirements367 as doors through which every in-
vention must pass to be patent eligible. 368 The Software Act seeks not
merely to open the door to software algorithm patents, but rather it
creates a new threshold. Much like the small door confronting the
oversized Alice in Wonderland, the Software Act door is designed to
fit only inventions as small as software algorithms. Yet, it is an im-
portant door. It is necessary to give shelter to valuable software algo-
rithms, since such protections are not available in the standard
copyright and patent houses. Copyright law is not the correct form of
protection for computer programs, since software is not truly litera-
ture. Few people read software source code for its prose or its beauty
as they would literature. Ten thousand lines of machine-readable code
does not truly represent beautiful art work. Few people read a com-
puter program for its plot. Rather, people buy software for its useful-
ness. Software is a toaster - a tool used to get a job done - and the
law should treat it as such.
Moreover, patent law fails to protect algorithms well - or
software at all. Software patents are limited to the terms "process"
and "machine." '369 Since a process generally requires transformation
of a physical raw material from one state into another, and a machine
requires newly configured physical hardware, cramming algorithms
into these definitions is difficult and unnatural. Patent process claims
366. See infra Appendix § 224.
367. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988).
368. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
369. 35 U.S.C. §101.
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for algorithms must be loaded with the buzz words of patentability
that have been approved by courts.37 ° Why should it be necessary to
wink and nudge at the PTO, pretending that algorithms are something
they are not? The open secret of recasting algorithms as processes is
reminiscent of the movie Casablanca, where Claude Raines is
"shocked, just shocked, to find out that there's gambling going on
here. '37 1 The practical requirement of patent-by-incantation is not
only deceptive, rather it provides a level of protection that is too un-
certain. Likewise, the Federal Circuit's tortured interpretation of the
term "machine" provides inherently illogical support for patentabil-
ity.372 The meaning of "process" and "machine" must be expanded373
to protect algorithms. Even amending §101 to explicitly enumerate
algorithms as patentable would be inappropriate because regular pat-
ent rights are too extensive, and the regular patent total exclusion is
too broad for software. While some might argue that the current sys-
tem is sufficient since it does protect some algorithms from infringe-
ment, the result of Stac Eletronics v. Microsoft Corp.3 74 illustrates that
even under the best-case scenario the current system resembles what
the Software Act would provide to the average scenario at a much
lower cost. Software algorithms do not deserve the theoretical full
strength patent protection they now enjoy. The current rights are theo-
retical because it is unlikely that most small software algorithm inven-
tors (who the law should seek to protect the most) will be able to
acquire and enforce those rights.
370. Patent lawyer Michael H. Jester describes the "Section 101 game" this way:
Over the past ten years, our patent law firm has prepared literally hundreds of
U.S. patent applications on programmed digital computers and software, the vast
majority of which have, or will, issue as U.S. patents. It has always been neces-
sary to package and present these particular inventions in a manner specifically
designed to avoid a rejection under 35 U.S.C. Section 101 .... The poor patent
lawyer who originally... naively claimed 'a computer program comprising...'
must redraft the claims to cast the invention in terms of a process for doing X, Y,
Z steps in a particular computer system environment, the steps being studiously
drafted to appear unalgorithm like.
Michael H. Jester, Letter to the Editor Re: "Interpreting In re Alappat with an Eye Towards
Prosecution," 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 348 (1995) (emphasis added).
371. CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942).
372. See supra part IV.D.
373. See Paula Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algo-
rithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMoRY L.J. 1025, 1142 (1990)
(suggesting that algorithms can be thought to be "shoehorned" into the terms "process" and
"machine"); see also, Richard Stem, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. Prrr.
L. Rnv. 1229, 1264-65 (1986) (proposing to eliminate the crisis resulting from each newly in-
vented technology out dating intellectual property law, by enacting skeleton legislation which the
PTO may activate to arm these new industrial properties with an off-the-shelf arsenal of protec-
tive tools).
374. CV 93-413-ER, Feb. 23, 1994 (C.D. Cal 1994); see also supra part IV.E.3.a.
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Opposition to this proposal might also be found among those ar-
guing that the establishment of petite patent for software will increase
the administrative burden on small software developers who would
have to file patent applications. This problem is addressed via inex-
pensive fees, central claims (which should be simpler to write than
peripheral claims), and the first-to-file method. Compulsory license
income should offset the cost of the application. Furthermore, the
benefit of added certainty of protection should outweigh the additional
cost of unknown litigation potential. Of course, an author could com-
pletely avoid the cost of filing, if he is willing to pay compulsory
royalties to another person who files first. This proposal offers rights
which developers previously did not have. While it may increase a
vendor's patent application budget, the supplemental rights are
designed to decrease the vendor's litigation budget. The mere addi-
tion of clarifying statutory definitions and more detailed bright lines
should eliminate the need for many suits before they ever begin.
The Software Act also provides a new weaker petite patent
designed to match the nature of software itself and the needs of its
market. Cheap, quick, and short protection would utilize central
claims that are examined only after infringement takes place. Petite
patents will be available only to commercial uses of the software al-
gorithm, thus eliminating the need for research exceptions in patent
claims. Central claims (rather than peripheral claims) benefit society,
while narrow claims leave room for future software to solve peripheral
problems in parts of the economy that were commercially ignored by
the patentee. Eliminating the patent reservation system prevents
claims covering every possible use of the algorithm in a computer,
unless the vendor actually commercially performs every possible use.
The Software Act presumes automatic claim to the literal code of
software, and provides substantial penalties for literal (letter-for-letter,
bit-for-bit) copying of elements which are not filtered out in the ab-
straction-filtration-comparison test. Blanket licensing of software al-
gorithms administered by large rights societies, such as, ASCAP or
the Software Protection Association, would provide the same kind of
benefits to the software industry that the music industry currently en-
joys (and for the same reasons). Anyone would be able to use the
algorithm at a fee. Yet, inventors will still be encouraged to disclose
their ideas which otherwise might have been locked up in regular pat-
ent fortresses or hidden under trade secret law. This compulsory li-
censing alternative will be faster and cheaper than today's ultimate
punishment of court injunction and seizure (which was not even effec-
tive in the Stac case, since Stac - financially - was forced to settle).
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The ideas presented in this proposal merit consideration at large.
As an alternative to the Second Circuit's call for a CONTU II second
round of federal computer law overhaul,375 a more global solution
needs to be sought in the form of an international convention similar
to the Berne and Paris Conventions. The computer industry is per-
fectly situated to draw upon the genius of not only legal scholars but
computer technical scholars. This paper proposes that the new con-
vention be named the "Internet Convention," as this could provide an
unparalleled opportunity for immediate substantial input from experts
all over the world. The Software Act proposes a small ("petite") ex-
periment: stepping U.S. law into closer harmony with the rest of the
world before attempting to amend the regular Patent Act. Ultimately,
the goal of universal global electronic filing is the only sensible solu-
tion in a world comprised of global markets.
375. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX-THE MODEL SOFrWARE PETITE PATENT AcT
PATENT ACT
35 U.S.C. §§ 221-237
CHAPTER 19-SOFTWARE ALGORITHM PATENTS
§ 221. Short Title
(a) This Act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Software Act."
§ 222. Patents for Software Algorithms
(a) Whoever invents an algorithm may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title, provided that the algorithm contains all
the following elements:
(1) anew
(2) non-obvious inventive step
(3) used in commerce
(4) in computer software
(5) in a new and useful configuration.
(b) The provisions of this title relating to patents for
inventions shall apply to patents for software
algorithms, except as otherwise provided.
§ 223. Definitions - Except as otherwise provided, the following
terms and their variant forms for this Chapter have the
following meanings:
(a) "Abandoned" means:
(1) express written disclaimer of claims by patent
owner; or
(2) the claimed element's use in commerce has
been discontinued with intent not to resume
such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred
from circumstances. Nonuse for two
consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence
of abandonment.
(b) "Algorithm" - The required elements of a claimed
algorithm are:
(1) a sequence of precisely defined computer
program steps
(2) that will work for data of a specified range and
type
(3) to produce answers of a specified quality
(4) that unambiguously solve a particular one of a
specified general class of problems
1996] 365
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(5) in a reasonably efficient finite time
(6) using a reasonably efficient finite allotment of
computational resources.
(c) "Claimed Element" means literal or nonliteral
algorithm element claimed. The source code and
object code are automatically claimed as literal
elements.
(d) "Literal element" means the machine-independent
source code, and the machine-dependant object
code, embodying the claimed algorithms.
(e) "Nonliteral element" means algorithms or
expressions other than those expressed as source
code or object code.
(f) "Canned computer software" means prewritten or
standard software computer software designed for
and distributed "as is" for multiple persons who
can use it without modifying its code and that is
not otherwise considered custom computer
software. It is off-the-shelf software not created for
a particular customer and sold to many different
customers without substantial modification by the
vendor for the customer. There is a presumption
that software is canned software where it costs less
than $10,000, or where sales tax is charged on the
software.
(g) "Custom computer software" means computer
software that is designed for a single person's or a
small group of persons' specific needs. "Custom
computer software" includes modifications to
canned computer software and can be developed in-
house by the user, by outside developers, or by
both. A group of four or more persons is presumed
not to be a small group of persons for the purposes
of this subsection unless each of the persons is
affiliated through common control and ownership.
The department may by rule provide a definition of
small group and affiliates consistent with this
subsection. "Custom computer software" means
software which:
(1) requires the software vendor's analysis of the
customer's requirements;
(2) for the vendor to substantially select, adapt,
modify, prepare, or develop the software;
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(3) pursuant to the customer's special order;
(4) exclusively for a specific user; and
(5) the software is of an original, one-of-a-kind
nature.
Example 1: A software vendor offers for sale a
prewritten program which can be used in several
computer models. Prior to operation, instructions
must be added by the vendor which specify the
particular computer model in which the program
will be utilized.
Example 2: An existing program is selected for
modification by the vendor, and the vendor makes
a substantial modification of that program so that it
may be used in the customer's specific make,
model, and version of hardware device or other
software.
(h) "Commerce" means, where not inconsistent with
this chapter, commerce as specified and interpreted
under Trademark Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
(i) "Commercial computer software" means computer
software which is used regularly for other than
Government purposes and is sold, licensed, or
leased in significant quantities to the general public
at established market or catalog prices.
(j) "Computer" means an electronic device that:
(1) is programmable;
(2) performs logical, arithmetic, and memory
functions by the electronic manipulation of
data;
(3) supplies the results of this data manipulation;
and
(4) the device has input, output, processing,
storage, and communication facilities
connected to the device or available to the
device via a computer network.
(k) "Computer equipment" or "hardware" mean central
processing units, microprocessors, data storage and
other computer memory devices, and computer
terminals or similar devices.
(1) "Computer network" means two or more computer
systems connected so as to permit the exchange or
sharing of data between or among them.
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(m) "Computer program" and "computer software" are
interchangeable terms.
(1) "Computer program" means computer code
which, when executed by a computer system,
causes the computer system to perform
computer services to solve a specific problem.
(2) Computer programs may be either machine-
independent or machine-dependent.
(i) "Computer Code" means a list of literal
text instructions or statements.
(ii) "Source Code" means the human-
readable machine-independent computer
code written in a computer programming
language.
(iii) "Object Code" means machine-dependent
computer code in written binary
language.
(iv) "Compile" or "Assemble" means to
convert source code into object code.
(v) "Decompile" or "Disassemble" means to
covert object code to source code.
(3) Computer programs may be general-purpose in
nature or be designed to satisfy the
requirements of a particular user.
(4) Computer programs are hereby deemed to be
"useful articles."
(5) Contrary to any state sales tax definition, the
term "computer program" in this chapter does
not mean:
(i) Databases; nor
(ii) Computer software documentation.
(n) "Computer software documentation" means human-
readable literature, data, or computer program code
listings or printouts, which:
(1) document the design or details of the software;
or
(2) explains the capabilities of the software; or
(3) provides operating instructions for using the
software to obtain desired results from a
computer.
(o) "Computer services" means data input, data output,
data processing, or data storage by or in a computer
system or computer network.
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(p) "Computer system" means computer equipment or
hardware connected together and operating under
the control of one or more computer programs.
(q) "Data" means numeric, textual, graphic, or other
information or records which are created, stored, or
retrievable by a computer or electronic means. The
term "data" does not include computer software,
which is the tool used to create, store, or retrieve
data.
(r) "Database" means a collection of data organized in
a strictly prescribed form and format capable of
being accessed or managed with the aid of
computer software, but that does not itself have the
capacity to direct the operation of a computer
system or other machinery or equipment.
Databases are protectable, if at all, by the
Copyright Act, not the Software Act.
(s) "Embedded software" is computer software that
resides permanently on some internal memory
device in a computer system or other machinery or
equipment, that is not removable in the ordinary
course of operation, and that is of a type necessary
for the routine operation of the computer system or
other machinery or equipment.
(t) "Member country" means any country which
(bolt-on option) [belongs to the Paris Convention.]
(sui generis option) [ joins the Software
Convention, gives effect to the provisions of this
Act, and offers reciprocal protection to nationals in
other Member Countries.]
(u) "Public domain computer software" means software
upon which the petite patent has expired or
software which has been abandoned.
(v) "Publish electronically" means providing the right
or ability to retrieve a document or data via the
Internet, an Electronic Bulletin Board System, a
commercial data service, or any other
telecommunications or storage-and-retrieval media.
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(w) "Reverse engineering, decompiling or
disassembling" means any process by which
computer software is converted from one form to
another form which is more readily understandable
to human beings, including without limitation any
decoding or decrypting of any computer program
which has been encoded or encrypted in any
manner.
(x) "Shareware" means software distributed for testing
and review purposes on the condition that payment is
required after the user decides to use the software.
(y) "Use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a
claimed element in the ordinary course of trade,
and not made merely to reserve a right in the
claimed element. For purposes of this chapter, a
claimed element shall be deemed to be in use in
commerce when:
(1) it is placed in computer software;
(2) the software is sold, transported, distributed, or
accessed in commerce; and
(3) not abandoned.
§ 224. Application
(a) Who May Be an Applicant. Only a national of
Member Countries may be an applicant under this
Act.
(b) Written application shall be made in the English
language by the inventor, or inventor's authorized
agent, to the Commissioner. Such applications
shall include:
(1) A specification or description which shall
disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently
clear and complete for the invention to be
carried out by a person skilled in the art; and
(2) One or more claims which, independent of the
specification, clearly and concisely point out
with particularity the distinct required elements
of each algorithm.
(i) Whenever appropriate, claims shall
contain:
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(A) a statement indicating those
technical features of the invention
which are necessary for the
definition of the claimed subject
matter but which, in combination,
are part of the prior art,
(B) a characterizing portion stating
concisely the technical features
which, in combination with the
features stated under (A), it desires
to protect.
(ii) Any claim which includes all the
features of one or more other claims
(claim in dependent form, hereinafter
"dependent claim") shall do so by a
reference, to the other claim or claims
and shall then state the additional
features claimed. "Multiple Dependent
Claims" (dependent claim which refers
to more than one other claim) are not
allowed.
(iii) If a court finds that any of these
requirements are not met, the court may
invalidate the claim, or the court may
equitably save the claim from invalidity
by filling in or recasting the claim to
meet the requirements; and
(3) Verification by the applicant, or applicant's
authorized agent, specifying:
(i) the applicant's domicile and citizenship;
(ii) the date of applicant's first commercial
use of each algorithm, or alternatively
applicant's good faith bona fide intention
to use each algorithm in commerce;
(iii) the goods or services in connection with
which the algorithm is used; mode or
manner in which the algorithm is used in
connection with such goods or services;
and
1996]
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(4) a statement that the person making the
verification believes himself, or the principal
on whose behalf he makes the verification, to
be the owner of the algorithm, and that no
other natural or artificial person or business
entity has the right to use such algorithm; and
(5) the fee prescribed by the Patent and Trademark
Office.
(c) Optional Standard Application Form.
(1) The Commissioner shall prescribe and make
available free of charge upon request an
optional standard application form which may
be used to fulfill the requirements of this
section.
(2) The optional application standard form shall be
published on paper and published
electronically.
(d) Optional Electronic Application Method.
(1) The Commissioner shall prescribe regulations
on the optional method of submitting an
application and payment electronically to the
Patent and Trademark Office.
(e) Unified Office. Applications may be filed from any
Member Country.
§ 225. Examination, Issue, and Effect of Patent
(a) The Commissioner shall not examine the invention
until challenge has been made.
(b) The Commissioner shall examine the application,
and if it appears that the requirements of
application have been met, the Commissioner shall
issue a patent.
(c) Software patents shall have a unitary character,
having equal effect throughout the territories of
Member Countries and may only be granted,
transferred, revoked, or allowed to lapse in respect
of the whole of such territories.
§ 226. Registration and Publication
(a) Issued patents shall be published in a Software
Patent Registry.
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(b) Documents may be recorded in the Software Patent
Registry to establish a public record of licenses,
documents transferring ownership of some or all
rights under this act, security interests in, and other
legal documents governing the relationship between
software patent owners and persons associated with
the commercial dissemination or use of such
software.
(c) Documents may be submitted in machine-readable
format, as the Commissioner may establish by
regulation.
(d) The date of recordation is the date when all of the
elements required for recordation, including the
prescribed fee have been received in the Patent and
Trademark Office. The Commissioner shall send
the applicant a certificate of record as evidence of
recordation. The Commissioner may destroy the
submission after preparing suitable copies.
(e) The Commissioner may publish electronically the
register and application information.
(f) The Commissioner may impose a filing fee by
regulation.
§ 227. Challenge of Algorithm Patent
(a) Any person who believes that he is, or will be,
damaged by the patent may challenge the patent at
any time.
(b) A challenge may be cited as an affirmative defense
or counterclaim to an infringement action.
(c) A challenge may be to the Patent and Trademark
Office upon payment of the prescribed fee.
(d) The challenge shall state the facts supporting the
grounds upon which it is based.
§ 228. Effect of Challenge
(a) A court may invalidate any or all claims of a patent
in its determination of an infringement suit.
(b) A court may order that:
(1) an infringer pay compulsory license fees, plus
costs, plus a penalty to the patent owner; or
(2) the Commissioner register or transfer a patent,
upon payment of registration fees; to a person
who has proved that he is entitled to it; or
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(3) invalidated claimed elements drop into the
public domain.
§ 229. Granted Rights
(a) In the case of software patents, the grant shall be
the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, offering for sale, or importing software
containing patentee's claimed elements without a
license from patentee.
(b) The right to "use" includes the act of loading
software from a storage medium into computer
memory and executing the software on a computer.
(c) The right to "import" excludes nonprofit,
noncommercial importation of no more than one
copy by one person at one time.
(d) The Secretary of the Treasury and the U.S. Postal
Service shall separately or jointly make regulations
for the enforcement of a patent owner's right to
prohibit parallel importation.
§ 230. Term of Software Algorithm Patent
(a) Patents for software algorithms shall be granted for
the term of ten years from the date of filing of the
patent application.
§ 231. Test of Infringement
(a) Whoever without authority exercises the granted
rights within any member country during the term
of the patent, infringes the patent.
(b) Infringement shall be determined using the
abstraction-filtration-comparison test.
§ 232. Abstraction Step
(a) Abstraction Step. The court may accept the level
of abstraction as cast in the claims as patented, or
may recast the claims sua sponte or upon motion
based upon its determination of the level of
abstraction.
§ 233. Filtration Step
(a) Failure to meet any element or requirement of
patentability under this chapter.
(b) A claimed element is invalidated where it claims
prior art.
(1) An element becomes prior art where before the
applicant's filing date it has been:
(i) patented;
[Vol. 12
MODEL SOFT WARE PETITE PATENT ACT
(ii) described in a patent application with an
earlier filing date;
(iii) described in publications available to the
public;
(iv) used in commerce; or
(v) is in the public domain.
(2) An element is not prior art where during the
year preceding the filing date:
(i) It is claimed by the inventor or his
successor in interest;
(ii) A competent national office that in
contravention of the applicable norms
publishes the content of the patent
application filed by the inventor or his
successor in interest;
(iii) A third party obtained the information
directly or indirectly from the inventor
or his successor in interest;
(iv) An evident abuse occurred vis-A-vis the
applicant or his successor in interest; or
(v) Applicant publicly exhibited the software
because it was necessary to make it
public in order to continue its
development. Applicant shall state at the
time of filing the application that the
invention has in fact been exhibited.
(c) Anti-Vaporware Provision
(1) "Vaporware" means:
(i) the public announcement of a
commercial computer software product
(ii) before it is commercially developed
(iii) with the sole intent of causing
consumers not to purchase
(iv) a competitor's commercially developed
product.
(2) "Commercially Developed" means that the
software exists, is workable, and is at a stage
where it could be sold on the commercial
market.
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(3) "Workable" means the software has been
analyzed or tested sufficiently to demonstrate
to a reasonable person skilled in the applicable
art that there is a high probability that it will
operate as intended.
(4) Vaporware claims shall be invalidated.
(5) Vaporware claims shall be prima facie
evidence of an unfair or deceptive act or
practice under Federal Trade Commission Act
section 45 [15 U.S.C. 45].
(d) Peripheral Claiming. A claim shall be invalidated
to the extent that it exceeds the scope of its
commercial embodiment.
(e) Anti-Orphanware Provision. A claim shall be
invalidated, and shall drop into the public domain,
when the claim has been abandoned.
(f) Prior Use. A software patent shall have no effect
against any person who proves prior use, or
substantial arrangements necessary for such use, in
a Member Country prior to filing date of the
application. This right can only be inherited or
transferred with the business.
(g) Exhaustion.
(1) The patent owner's right to use, sell, or offer
for sale (but not the right to import) canned
software shall be exhausted with respect to a
particular copy following first sale of that
copy.
(2) Software licensing conditions limiting the right
to resell (but not import) or use canned
software shall be voidable.
(3) The software customer may authorize agents to
exercise the exhausted rights on his behalf,
including the right to use the software.37 6
(h) Public Domain. Elements fully within the public
domain do not infringe.
(i) Scenes a Faire. Stock elements commonly found in
a general class of computer programs do not
infringe.
(j) De Minimis Use. Literal copying of a small and
insignificant portion of the work does not infringe.
376. Overturns MAI Systems v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1992).
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(k) Nonprofit, Noncommercial Use.
(1) Reverse Engineering and Decompilation Right. A
software patent shall not affect a user's right to
learn the internal design of a program by studying
and experimenting with disassembled or
decompiled portions of, or all of, the program code.
(m) Equitable Defenses. Elements may be filtered out
or invalidated, based upon equitable principles
including but not limited to: fraud, inequitable
conduct, laches, promissory estoppel, unclean
hands, unfair competition, or unjust enrichment.
§ 234. Not Filters. An infringer may be liable to pay a
reasonable royalty upon, and a claim shall not be
invalidated solely on the grounds that it is:
(a) A method of doing business;
(b) A mathematical formula;
(c) Any reason listed in Copyright Act § 102(b) (idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery); 377
(d) An element dictated by petite-patented
compatibility requirements of computer hardware,
software, industry, or programming standards; or
(e) It preempts all or most other means or expressions
of its idea.378
§ 235. Comparison Step
(a) The claimed elements remaining after filtration
shall be compared to the accused elements.
(b) If the court determines that the remaining elements
have been literally copied (letter-for-letter or bit-
for-bit), then the court shall impose substantial
penalties or actual damages, plus costs.
(c) If the court determines that the remaining elements
have been nonliterally copied, then the court shall
impose a compulsory nonexclusive license, plus a
reasonable penalty. Factors of nonliteral copying,
include, but are not limited to:
(1) substantial similarity in both ideas and
expression;
(2) error common to both the accuser's and
accusee's work; or
377. Overrides Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807 (Ist Cir. 1995).
378. Merger doctrine does not apply.
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(3) the accused work is designed or optimized
substantially in light of the accuser's hardware
or software environment rather than the
accusee's
§ 236. Compulsory Nonexclusive License
(a) Definitions - for this section:
(1) "Licensed product" means products or services
embodying or made in accordance with one of
more claims of a software patent.
(2) "Improvement" means any modification to a
patent, which if unlicensed, would infringe one
or more claims of a software patent.
(3) "Granted rights" means the right to make, use,
offer for sale, sell, and import Licensed
Products.
(4) "Manufactured and sold" means, for the
purposes of computing royalties, when billed
out, or when shipped, or when paid for, or
when otherwise disposed of, whichever shall
occur first.
(b) Any person may obtain a compulsory license to
commercially exercise the granted rights of the
patent, unless such license would be contrary to the
public interest.
(c) A compulsory licensee is not required by this
section to assign future improvements of the
licensed patents to the licensor. Compulsory
licensee is entitled to file application for patent in
licensee's own name (or licensee's principal's
name) on the derivative species improvement of the
original genus patent.
(d) Noncompete clauses in compulsory licenses shall
be voidable.
(e) Notice of Intention to Obtain Compulsory License.
(1) Any person may obtain a compulsory license
under this section to exercise the granted rights
by serving notice to do so on the patent owner
and the Patent and Trademark Office within 30
days after such exercise of granted rights. The
notice shall comply in form, content, and
manner of service, with requirements that the
Commissioner shall prescribe by regulation.
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(2) Failure to serve or file the notice required by
this section forecloses the possibility of a
compulsory license, and in the absence of a
negotiated license, renders the making, using,
or selling of the patent an act of infringement
subject to the remedies provided under this
title.
(f) Royalty Payable Under Compulsory License
(1) To be entitled to receive royalties under a
compulsory license, the patent owner must be
identified in the registration or other public
records of the Patent and Trademark Office.
The patent owner is entitled to royalties for
use of the patent occurring only after being so
identified and is not entitled to recover for the
exercise of the granted rights prior to the
registration date.
(2) The compulsory licensee shall pay by the
royalty due date a reasonable royalty equalling
the royalty base multiplied by the royalty rate
multiplied by the royalty index.
(i) The Commissioner shall establish by
regulation royalty bases, royalty rates,
and royalty indexes.
(ii) The royalty base may differ for different
classes of claims, to be the unit quantity
or the net sales of licensed product
manufactured and sold, metered, or any
other reasonable base.
(iii) The royalty rate shall be an amount
determined by the Commissioner to
provide a reasonable royalty.
(iv) The royalty index shall be a factor to
adjust for economic inflation or
deflation.
(v) The royalty due date shall be the
twentieth day of each month for royalties
for the month next preceding, unless the
Commissioner determines another
reasonable date.
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(3) The Commissioner shall prescribe regulations
under which detailed cumulative annual
statements of account, certified by a certified
public accountant, shall be filed for every
compulsory license under this section. The
monthly and annual statements of account shall
prescribe the form, content, and manner of
certification.
(4) If the patent owner does not receive payments
and statements when due, the owner may give
written notice to the licensee that, unless the
default is remedied within 30 days from the
date of the notice, the compulsory license will
be automatically terminated. Such termination
renders licensee's further exercise of the
granted rights act of infringement subject to
the remedies under this title.
§ 237. Blanket Licensing Alternative
(a) Software rights societies or organizations may act
as clearinghouses administering nonexclusive
licenses to users and paying royalties to petite
patent owners. If a software rights society or
organization and a putative licensee are unable to
agree on a fee within 60 days, the putative licensee
may apply to the District Court for a determination
of a reasonable fee, with the rights society or
organization having the burden of proving
reasonableness.
(b) Exemption from Antitrust Laws. The antitrust laws
shall not apply to software licensing agreements
related to software rights societies or organizations,
provided that such agreements allow the patent
owner to opt out of the blanket license via a directly
negotiated license with a licensee.
[Vol. 12
